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RATS PLAYING A SLOT MACHINE: A PRELIMINARY  
ATTEMPT AT AN ANIMAL GAMBLING MODEL 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly and Adam Derenne 
University of North Dakota 
 
Due to certain ethical and procedural considerations, it is not possible to con-
duct certain experimental studies on human gambling behavior.  Animal mod-
els of gambling may hold some utility because they can possibly overcome 
these considerations.  The present experiment was a first attempt to establish an 
animal model of gambling by having rats play a “slot machine.”  Rats pressed a 
lever on a fixed-ratio 5 schedule of reinforcement.  In the Cue conditions, a 
bank of stimulus lights flashed after the completion of the ratio, with the pattern 
of lights that subsequently remained illuminated signaling what consequence 
would be received (i.e., a “loss” or small, medium, or large “win”).  In the No-
Cue conditions, the stimulus display was not used and the consequences were 
not signaled.  Results showed that, in terms of preratio pausing, the rats dis-
played a similar pattern of behavior as shown by humans playing an actual slot 
machine.  However, this pattern of behavior did not vary as a function of the 
presence or absence of the “slot” stimuli as one might expect to observe with 
human gamblers.  Thus, the procedure shows some promise as an animal model 
of gambling, but additional modifications are necessary before it can be consi-
dered an adequate model. 
Keywords: Gambling, Post-reinforcement Pause, Fixed-ratio Schedule, 
Lever Press, Rats. 
____________________ 
 
     Gambling occurs when one risks a valued 
commodity, such as money, on a probabilistic 
outcome over which the gambler has little or 
no control.  Many people will gamble at least 
some point in their lives and, on most occa-
sions, the behavior is not especially harmful.  
Of special concern, however, is a minority of 
individuals suffering from pathological gam-
bling. According to Petry (2005), the preva-
lence of pathological gamblers likely ranges 
from 1-3% of the world population. 
     Although thousands of articles have been 
published to date on the topic of pathological 
gambling, the origins of the problem are not 
yet well understood. We believe that for 
___________ 
Address Correspondence to: 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly, Ph.D. 
Department of Psychology 
University of North Dakota 
Grand Forks, ND 58202-8380 
Phone: (701) 777-3470 
Fax: (701) 777-3454 
E-mail: jeffrey weatherly@und.nodak.edu 
significant progress to be made in addressing 
the problem, it is necessary that more investi-
gations be experimental in nature
1
. One rea-
son, perhaps, why more experimental investi-
gations are not performed is that it is illegal in 
many parts of the United States to possess 
gaming equipment, even if only for research 
purposes.  Also, while sound experimentation 
requires control over the situation, such as the 
outcome of individual gambles, such control 
is inconsistent with the goal of establishing 
external and/or face validity (but see MacLin, 
Dixon, & Hayes, 1999).  Finally, certain as-
pects of a gambling situation cannot be repli-
cated in the laboratory. Researchers, for ex-
ample, cannot ethically allow participants to 
                                                          
1
 A literature search using the search engine SCOPUS, 
conducted on January 22, 2007, yielded 1,660 articles 
when using a keyword search with the term “gam-
bling.”  However, only 29 articles were obtained when 
the term “experiment” was cross-referenced with 
“gambling.” 
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risk their own money or to go into debt due to 
their participation. Likewise, the researcher 
has no control over the participants’ pre-
experimental learning histories that might 
contribute to gambling behavior (see Wea-
therly & Phelps, 2006, for a more detailed 
discussion).  Although changes in the law and 
advances in technology can help address 
some shortcomings of conducting laboratory 
gambling research, other shortcomings, such 
as the inability to recreate actual financial 
risk, are intractable.  As with other fields of 
study, when ethical considerations preclude 
the use of human participants, nonhuman an-
imal models may be of use (e.g., see Madden, 
Ewan, & Lagorio, 2007, for a recent review). 
     In one of the first attempts to model gam-
bling in animals, Kendall (1987) gave two 
food-deprived pigeons repeated opportunities 
to choose between two food-reinforced alter-
natives.  One alternative was a “sure thing” 
that, if chosen, provided food on a fixed-ratio 
(FR) 30 schedule of reinforcement.  The other 
choice was a “gamble” that led to either a FR 
10 schedule of reinforcement for a period of 
time or a 60-s timeout.  In other words, under 
the gambling option, subjects could potential-
ly “win” or “lose” a greater or lesser, respec-
tively, rate of reinforcement.  Results indi-
cated that the gambling option was preferred 
and that preference was determined principal-
ly by the probability of the FR 10 schedule 
rather than the length of time the FR 10 sche-
dule remained in effect (i.e., the probability of 
a “win” was more critical than its size).  In a 
later study, Kendall (1989) manipulated the 
length of the timeout period.  Once again, the 
probability of the FR 10 schedule was found 
to be the critical variable and the size of the 
“loss” had little impact on behavior. 
     In a similar investigation, Christopher 
(1988), gave pigeons concurrent access to FR 
and variable-ratio (VR) schedules of food 
reinforcement in a closed economy.  The FR 
schedule provided 3-s access to food rein-
forcement, and the VR schedule provided 
reinforcers of variable durations (i.e., 3 s to 15 
s).  Early in training, the duration of rein-
forcement on the VR schedule was typically 
long. Under these conditions, the subjects 
tended to choose the VR option and gained 
weight as a result.  Later, however, the aver-
age duration of reinforcement was reduced 
until it was less than that offered by the FR 
alternative.  Nevertheless, subjects continued 
to choose the VR alternative and lost weight 
as a result.  Ultimately, Christopher had to 
discontinue the VR alternative because sub-
jects reached dangerously low body weights.  
This tendency for the subjects to persistently 
gamble despite “losing” is analogous to the 
problems suffered by pathological gamblers. 
In addition to research featuring variable 
consequences for completion of the ratio, 
there is a large literature comparing respond-
ing on FR and VR schedules of reinforcement 
(i.e., a schedule in which the reinforcer is de-
livered at predictable times with one in which 
it is not).  Although research of this kind is 
not intended explicitly to model gambling, it 
nevertheless reveals mechanisms likely af-
fecting gambling choices. For example, Mad-
den, Dake, Mauel, and Rowe (2005) had pig-
eons respond on FR or random-ratio (RR) 
schedules (a variant of VR schedules) for 
food reinforcement within a closed economy. 
When the ratio was relatively small, both 
schedules maintained similar levels of operant 
behavior. However, at large ratios (e.g., 3 
food pellets per 384 responses), the RR sche-
dule maintained much greater levels of res-
ponding. In fact, pigeons made over 35,000 
more responses per day on the RR schedule 
than on the equivalent FR schedule at the 
largest response requirement. Results such as 
this suggest that reinforcers delivered by RR 
or VR schedules are more valuable than those 
delivered by FR schedules (see Madden et al., 
2007, for a discussion which attributes prefe-
rence for VR reinforcement to the manner in 
which organisms discount delayed rewards). 
     Unlike previous studies of gambling-like 
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behavior in nonhumans, the present study 
used a procedure that was an attempt to more 
closely mimic the basic features of slot-
machine gambling on the human level than 
these previous attempts at animal models.  
For humans, slot-machine gambling entails 
the deposit of a number of tokens into the ma-
chine, pushing a button (or pulling a handle) 
to initiate the gamble, the appearance of spin-
ning symbols on multiple reels, and the final 
display of a symbol array that indicates 
whether the person lost or how many tokens 
the person won.  By comparison, in the 
present study a rat was required to press a 
lever a certain number of times (a small FR 
schedule was in effect). Once the response 
requirement was complete, a 3 X 3 grid of 
lights located above the lever began to flash.  
After the flashing ceased, three lights re-
mained illuminated and the arrangement of 
these lights indicated the outcome.  If the 
lights appeared in a diagonal fashion, the sub-
ject “lost” and no reinforcer was delivered.  If 
the first, second, or third columns of lights 
were illuminated, then a “small,” “medium,” 
or “large” amount of the reinforcer, respec-
tively, was delivered. 
     Unlike the research of Kendall or Christo-
pher, the procedure was not designed to de-
termine whether subjects would choose to 
gamble despite losses.  Instead, all subjects 
were required to “gamble” throughout the 
procedure and the variables of interest con-
cerned the specific patterning of behavior dur-
ing the session.  Observations of gambling in 
humans suggest that the latency from one 
gamble to the next is short when the outcome 
of the gamble is a loss.  The latency increases 
when the result is a win, and the longest la-
tencies tend to follow the largest wins (Del-
fabbro & Winefield, 1999; Schreiber & Di-
xon, 2001). To determine whether rats would 
show an analogous response pattern, we 
measured the preratio pause before each gam-
ble (i.e., the latency from the end of the pre-
vious consequence to the first response on the 
following ratio).  Furthermore, we observed 
the rate at which each ratio was completed to 
determine whether the speed of a gamble 
would be affected by the consequences deli-
vered on the previous ratio. 
     The FR task described above for rats cap-
tures many of the aspects found in human slot 
machine gambling; however, some features 
are also absent. For instance, the rat does not 
deposit tokens nor does it “lose” anything 
beyond the effort expended to press the lever.  
However, the goal of the present study was 
not to perfectly mimic the human situation.  
Rather, the goal was to determine whether the 
behavior of a rat faced with this situation 
would resemble that of a person playing a slot 
machine.  We predicted it would (i.e., shorter 
pauses after losses and longer pauses after 
wins). Of secondary interest was also whether 
the rats’ behavior would come under the con-
trol of the “slot” stimuli, as these stimuli ar-
guably contribute to human gambling beha-
vior (e.g., see Ghezzi, Wilson, & Porter, 
2006).  In this regard, we predicted that the 
rats’ behavior would differ between condi-
tions in which the procedure presented or did 
not present the “slot” stimuli.  If these goals 
are not met, then further pursuit of this para-
digm can be dropped.  If they are met, then 
further intricacies could be built into the pro-
cedure so as to better model the actual situa-
tion faced by a person who is gambling. 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
     The subjects were seven experimentally 
experienced male Sprague-Dawley rats origi-
nally obtained from the Center for Biomedical 
Research on the campus of the University of 
North Dakota.  Subjects were approximately 
14 months of age at the beginning of the 
study.  All had experience pressing a lever for 
liquid sucrose and food pellets delivered by a 
random-interval schedule of reinforcement.  
Subjects were maintained at approximately 
85% of their free-feeding weights via post-
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session feedings or daily feedings on days that 
sessions were not conducted.  Because the 
subjects were experienced, their food-
restricted weights had been established prior 
to the present study.  Those weights were con-
tinuously maintained.  The rats were housed 
individually with water available only in the 
home cage.  They experienced a 12/12 hr 
light/dark cycle.  Experimental sessions were 
conducted during the light portion of the 
cycle.  All care and maintenance of the rats 
conformed to the guidelines published by the 
National Research Council (1996). 
 
Apparatus 
     Subjects responded in an experimental 
chamber for rats (Coulbourn Instruments) that 
measured 30.5 (L) by 25.0 (W) by 28.5 cm 
(H).  The chamber was equipped with one re-
sponse lever that was located on the left side 
of the front panel, 2.5 cm from the left wall 
and 6.5 cm above the grid floor.  The lever 
was 3.5-cm-wide by 0.1-cm-thick and ex-
tended 2 cm into the chamber.  The lever re-
quired a force of approximately 0.25 N to de-
press.  Five cm above the lever was a panel of 
three stimulus lights (red, yellow, and green 
from left to right).  Each light was 0.6 cm in 
diameter.  The yellow light was centered on 
the panel, with the red and green lights 0.6 cm 
to the left and right, respectively.  A second 
panel of stimulus lights was located 5 cm 
above the first, and a third panel was located 
5 cm above the second.  Together, these pa-
nels formed a grid of nine stimulus lights.  
Centered on the front panel, 2 cm above the 
grid floor, was a 3.3-cm-wide by 3.8-cm-high 
by 2.5-cm-deep opening that allowed access 
to a trough into which reinforcers were deli-
vered.  Liquid sucrose was delivered to the 
trough by a syringe pump that was located 
outside of the chamber and attenuating cu-
bicle.  Food pellets were delivered to the 
trough by a dispenser that was located behind 
the front panel.  A 1.5-cm-diameter house-
light provided general illumination during the 
session.  The houselight was centered on the 
back wall of the chamber, 2.5 cm below the 
ceiling. 
     The chamber was located inside a sound-
attenuating cubicle equipped with a ventila-
tion fan to mask outside noise.  The experi-
mental events were programmed, and data 
were recorded, by a desktop computer that 
was connected to a Coulbourn Instruments 
Universal Linc and that ran Graphic State 
software (Coulbourn Instruments).  The con-
trol equipment was located in a room adjacent 
to the one housing the experimental chamber. 
 
Procedure 
     Subjects were experimentally experienced 
and were therefore immediately placed on the 
procedure.  Subjects responded in two types 
of sessions, Cue and No Cue.  The Cue ses-
sions were those in which the “slot” stimuli 
were presented.  A FR 5 schedule was in ef-
fect at the beginning of each of these sessions.  
Once the subject completed the response re-
quirement, the nine stimulus lights above the 
lever flashed.  The lights simultaneously al-
ternated between on and off every 0.2 s for a 
total of 5 s.  After 5 s, the lights stopped flash-
ing and three lights remained illuminated in 
one of four combinations.  Specifically, the 
left, center, or right column of lights was il-
luminated or three lights in a downward di-
agonal pattern were illuminated.  These pat-
terns were displayed for 1 s (in an attempt to 
enhance their salience), after which one of 
four consequences occurred.  One conse-
quence was a “small” win.  This outcome oc-
curred when the left column of (red) lights 
was illuminated and consisted of 0.05 ml of 
5% liquid sucrose (v/v mixed with tap water) 
being delivered to the trough.  The second 
was a “medium” win, which occurred when 
the center column of (yellow) lights was illu-
minated and consisted of 0.2 ml of 5% su-
crose.  The third was a “large” win, which 
occurred when the right column of (green) 
lights was illuminated.  The large win was a 
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45-mg food pellet (Research Diets, Formula 
A/I). These three types of “wins” were chosen 
based on previous work, both published (e.g., 
Weatherly, Stout, Rue, & Melville, 2000) and 
unpublished, from our laboratory that indi-
cated that rats respond at higher rates for food 
pellet reinforcers than for 5% sucrose rein-
forcers and for 0.2 ml of 5% sucrose than 0.05 
ml of 5% sucrose.  The final outcome was a 
“loss.”  The loss occurred when the diagonal 
pattern was displayed and resulted in no rein-
forcement. 
     After the occurrence (or non occurrence in 
the case of a loss) of the programmed conse-
quence, the FR 5 schedule was again in effect.  
The stimulus display from the prior trial con-
tinued to be illuminated until the FR 5 was 
completed.  Once completed, the lights again 
flashed for 5 s, etc.  The session progressed in 
this fashion until the subject completed 101 
ratios.  For data analysis purposes, the first 
ratio was discarded because it did not allow 
for the calculation of a post-reinforcement 
pause.  The final trial ended after completion 
of the FR 5 (i.e., the consequence was that the 
session ended).  Thus, subjects experienced 
100 outcomes per session.  The start of the 
session was signaled by the illumination of 
the houselight, which was continuously illu-
minated throughout the session.  The end of 
the session was signaled by extinguishing the 
houselight. 
     The No-Cue sessions were identical to the 
Cue sessions with the exception that the “slot” 
stimuli were not presented.  Specifically, 
when the subject completed the FR 5, only the 
left/red light on the lowest stimulus panel 
flashed for 5 s.  That light was continually 
illuminated when the consequence was deli-
vered regardless of whether the consequence 
was non-reinforcement or a small, medium, or 
large reinforcer (identical to those described 
above).  As in the Cue conditions, reinforcers 
were delivered 1 s after the light ceased flash-
ing.  No-Cue sessions were conducted to de-
termine whether the behavior of the subjects 
came under the control of the “slot” stimuli in 
the Cue condition or was controlled by the 
different outcomes. Subjects responded in a 
total of four conditions.  In the initial two 
conditions, the probability of each type of 
“win” was 20%, and the probability of a loss 
was 40%.  In the final two conditions, the 
probability of each type of “win” was de-
creased to 15%, and the probability of a loss 
was increased to 55%.  These different proba-
bilities were chosen so that part of the time 
the probability of winning exceeded that of 
losing (i.e., the 20% conditions) and part of 
the time the probability of losing exceeded 
that of winning (i.e., the 15% conditions).  
Four subjects completed these four conditions 
in the sequence Cue, No-Cue, Cue, No-Cue.  
The remaining three subjects experienced 
conditions in the sequence No-Cue, Cue, No-
Cue, Cue.  All conditions were conducted for 
23 consecutive sessions, with sessions con-
ducted daily, five to six days per week. 
 
RESULTS 
     Figure 1 shows the mean preratio pause 
duration as a function of type of consequence 
experienced following the previous ratio dur-
ing each condition.  The data were derived 
from the final five sessions of each condition.  
The error bars represent one standard error of 
the mean across subjects for that particular 
consequence in that particular condition.  The  
figure shows that pause durations were short-
er following non-reinforcement than follow-
ing reinforcement.  When reinforcement was 
delivered, the duration of the pause increased 
across the small, medium, and large “wins.” 
     Results from statistical analyses supported 
this description.  A three-way (Cue condition 
by Win percentage by Outcome type) re-
peated measures ANOVA, conducted on the 
pause durations of individual subjects, pro-
duced a significant main effect of outcome 
type, F (3, 18) = 20.32, p < 0.001. The linear-
polynomial contrast for the effect of outcome 
type was also significant, indicating that 
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Figure 1.  Presented are the post-consequence pauses for the mean of all subjects for each type of outcome in 
each of the conditions. 
 
pausing increased linearly across the four out-
comes, F (1, 6) = 44.20, p= 0.001.  The main 
effect of cue condition was not significant 
(i.e., p < 0.05), but significant differences 
were obtained for the main effect of win per-
centage, F (1, 6) = 7.64, p = 0.033, and the 
interaction between win percentage and out-
come type, F (3, 18) = 7.03, p= 0.003.  As can 
be seen in Figure 1, pause durations in the 
20% conditions, especially following the me-
dium and large “wins,” were longer than in 
the 15% conditions.  None of the interactions  
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Figure 2.  Presented are the run rates for the mean of all subjects for each type of outcome in each of the condi-
tions. 
 
involving cue condition were significant. 
     Figure 2 shows run rates observed under 
the various conditions and types of conse-
quences.  It was constructed similarly to Fig-
ure 1.  The data in Figure 2 offer little to sug-
gest that there were systematical differences 
in behavior across conditions.  A three-way 
(Cue condition by Win percentage by Out-
come type) repeated measures ANOVA did 
yield a significant main effect of outcome 
type, F (3, 18) = 3.28, p= 0.045.  For this ef-
fect, the cubic polynomial contrast was signif-
icant, F (1, 6) = 6.31, p=0.046.  As can be 
seen in Figure 2, this outcome was largely 
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driven by longer run rates after large “wins” 
than after the other consequences. None of the 
other main effects or interactions was statisti-
cally significant. 
 
DISCUSSION 
     The present experiment was an attempt to 
establish whether the procedure was a legiti-
mate potential animal model of gambling.  To 
this end, the results were mixed.  On the posi-
tive side, the observed pattern of behavior did 
resemble that of people who play slot ma-
chines.  On the negative side, this pattern of 
behavior did not appear to be controlled by 
the presence of the “slot” stimuli, as docu-
mented by the similar pattern of behavior ob-
served between the Cue and No-Cue condi-
tions. 
     As previously reported for people playing 
slot machines (e.g., Delfabbro & Winefield, 
1999; Schreiber & Dixon, 2001), the pause 
durations of the rats was shortest following 
“losses” and longest following large “wins.”  
The exact ramification of this outcome can be 
debated because both outcomes would be 
considered consistent with the broader litera-
ture on ratio schedules of reinforcement.  For 
example, finding shorter pauses following 
non-reinforcement than following reinforce-
ment is not surprising, if only because there is 
no reinforcer for the subject to stop and con-
sume.  Previous studies using percentile sche-
dules of reinforcement have found that the 
preratio pause following non-reinforcement is 
only a small fraction of that following rein-
forcement, including at small ratios (Baron & 
Derenne, 2000).  This finding would suggest 
that the factors responsible for pausing are 
mostly absent following non-reinforcement.  
In fact, the differences in pausing after non-
reinforcement and reinforcement in the 
present study were not extremely large rela-
tive to those previously reported.  The reasons 
for this outcome are not immediately clear, 
and it is possible that the present procedure 
played a role in that outcome. 
     On its face, the finding that pause dura-
tions increased as a function of the size of the 
previous win is also consistent with findings 
from basic research on ratio schedule perfor-
mance (e.g., Lowe, Davey, & Harzem, 1974), 
at least when the size of the upcoming rein-
forcer is not signaled (Perone & Courtney, 
1992).  A somewhat longer pause may be ex-
pected after large reinforcers because a larger 
reinforcer requires more time for consumption 
than a small one.  However, the terms small, 
medium, and large “wins” in the present study 
do not necessarily correspond linearly to the 
amount of time subjects needed to consume 
them.  For instance, it would seem reasonable 
to conclude that the subjects needed more 
time to consume the medium (i.e., 0.2 ml) 
than the small (i.e., 0.05 ml) “win.”  Howev-
er, it is possible that the time needed to con-
sume the 45-mg food-pellet large “win” was 
actually less than that for either the small or 
medium “wins” because the pellet could be 
placed completely in the rat’s mouth, allow-
ing it to be eaten while the rat oriented back 
toward the lever.  The liquid reinforcers had 
to be licked from the trough.  Thus, the 
present differences in pausing are not the ob-
vious outcome of differences in reinforcer 
size. 
     It is also the case that previous studies 
point to factors other than the amount of rein-
forcement per se as being responsible for the 
change in preratio pausing.  Pausing may par-
tially be the result of conditioned inhibition 
elicited by the previous reinforcer. That is, the 
previous reinforcer signals the beginning of a 
period of time in which subsequent rein-
forcement is unavailable. Large previous rein-
forcers may act as particularly salient stimuli 
prompting longer-than-average pauses. Also 
possible is that once subjects receive the larg-
est possible win, the probability that the sub-
sequent response requirement will yield a less 
favorable outcome is very high. Therefore, 
pausing may be longer because the subject is 
transition from a more-to-a-less favorable sit-
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uation (cf. Galuska, Wade-Galuska, Woods, 
& Winger, 2007, for specific examples of this 
kind). 
     As was the case with comparison of rein-
forcement and non-reinforcement, the differ-
ence in pausing following the different win 
amounts was small compared to findings from 
analogous studies designed to examine ratio 
schedule performance.  It is possible that this 
outcome was mitigated by some features of 
the present procedure. For example, the small 
response requirement may have minimized 
the contribution of conditioned inhibition to 
pausing, and the cue stimuli may have over-
shadowed the signal provided by the reinforc-
er. In other words, while gambling may entail 
elements similar to ratio schedules of rein-
forcement, those elements may not be of the 
kind that evokes long pauses in responding. 
Regardless, the present results on pausing are 
a novel contribution to the basic literature.  
We are not aware of previous work on ratio 
schedule pausing that has manipulated both 
quality and quantity of reinforcement within 
the same procedure. 
     The present procedure also failed to pro-
duce easily interpreted changes in run rates 
(see Figure 2).  Run rates after “large” wins 
exceeded those after other outcomes.  Al-
though systematic, these differences were not 
large (i.e., 1 s at the greatest discrepancy).  
Overall, run rates are less sensitive to sche-
dule parameters than pause durations (e.g., 
Baron & Derenne, 2000), so this outcome was 
not necessarily unexpected.  Indeed, once the 
pause has been terminated, the most efficient 
possible response pattern is to complete the 
response requirement in the shortest possible 
time. 
     Despite the present results being consistent 
with the overall literature on pausing, we be-
lieve the present procedure still retains poten-
tial utility as an animal model for gambling.  
For instance, one topic that has received con-
siderable interest in the gambling literature is 
the effect of “near misses” on a slot machine 
(e.g., Ghezzi et al., 2006; Kassinove & 
Schare, 2001).  A near miss occurs when all 
but one winning symbols appear on the win 
line of the slot machine, with the remaining 
winning symbol just off the win line (e.g., one 
spot above or below where it would need to 
be for a win to occur).  Much of the research 
in this area has focused on what function the 
near miss plays in maintaining gambling be-
havior (e.g., a conditioned reinforcer), but a 
universally accepted conclusion has yet to 
emerge.  The present procedure could aid this 
research process.  That is, it should be possi-
ble using the stimulus array to present the an-
imal with a “near miss.”  One can then design 
an experimental procedure to assess the func-
tion of the “near miss” stimuli.  If, for in-
stance, the near miss is serving as a condi-
tioned reinforcer, then it should be possible to 
teach the animal a new operant response using 
the presentation of the “near miss” stimulus as 
the reinforcer. 
     Before such research takes place, however, 
another deficit in the present procedure must 
be addressed.  Although the rats displayed a 
pattern of behavior similar to that observed 
when humans play a slot machine, the rats’ 
behavior did not vary as a function of the 
presence of the slot stimuli.  This outcome 
may have occurred for a number of different 
reasons.  One possibility is that the rats simp-
ly did not attend to the stimuli and, instead, 
oriented toward the food trough once the sti-
mulus light(s) started flashing (i.e., goal track-
ing; e.g., see Farwell & Ayres, 1979).  A 
second, and potentially related, possibility is 
that the present procedure induced certain be-
haviors between the completion of the FR 
schedule and the delivery of the consequence 
(i.e., adjunctive behaviors; Staddon & Sim-
melhag, 1971).  Adjunctive behaviors would 
have competed with the rats’ ability to attend 
to the stimuli.  This possibility is an interest-
ing one given that people have been shown to 
display adjunctive behaviors when gambling 
(e.g., Clarke, 1977). 
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     Alternatively, the failure of the stimuli to 
control behavior may have simply been re-
lated to our choice of subject: the Sprague-
Dawley rat.  We had these rats available in 
our colony prior to the experiment and there-
fore they were subjects of convenience.  
However, Sprague-Dawley rats are albino rats 
that are not visually oriented.  At best, the rats 
would have attended to the location and ar-
rangement of the lights in the slot array, not to 
their color.  It is possible that stimulus control 
by the “slot” stimuli would have emerged if a 
visually adept subject had been used (e.g., a 
different strain of rat or a different species 
altogether, such as pigeons).  Regardless of 
which of the above possibilities may be cor-
rect, demonstrating such stimulus control 
would be a necessary step before the present 
procedure could be used to pursue other re-
search questions such as the near-miss effect. 
     As noted above, the present procedure 
lacks many of the variables that one would 
find in the human gambling scenario.  How-
ever, many of these variables could be added 
on to the procedure.  Humans are given my-
riad choices (e.g., gamble vs. not gamble; slot 
machine X vs. slot machine Y) whereas the 
present procedure did not incorporate choice.  
This difference could be rectified by provid-
ing access to a second lever that produced a 
fixed reinforcer for a fixed price and no “slot” 
stimuli.  Human gamblers lose money and can 
possibly go into debt.  The rats in the present 
procedure expended only effort and were 
maintained at a constant body weight regard-
less of the outcomes experienced during data 
collection.  Both, however, could be changed.  
One could arrange a “bank account” of res-
ponses (e.g., the rat can only respond 100 
times per session) or train the animals to use 
tokens.  Likewise, one could mimic “debt” by 
allowing the subjects to lose weight if they 
“gambled” and “lost,” much as did Christo-
pher (1988; and see Madden et al., 2007, for a 
discussion of “closed economies” in animal 
models of gambling). 
     Thus, although the present attempt at an 
animal model of gambling was not wholly 
successful, the procedure shows some prom-
ise.  It generates behavior patterns similar to 
those observed when people play slot ma-
chines.  Complexities can be added that make 
it even more similar to the human gambling 
situation than just the presentation of “slot” 
stimuli.  Finally, because the experimental 
can control both the environment and the his-
tory of the subject, developing a successful 
animal model may lead to answering ques-
tions about gambling that may not be possible 
or ethical when studying humans (and see 
Madden et al., 2007, for additional arguments 
in favor of animal models).  Additional re-
search with the present model is certainly ne-
cessary.  It would also seem warranted. 
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ASSESSING AND MANIPULATING THE ILLUSION OF  
CONTROL OF VIDEO POKER PLAYERS 
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Southern Illinois University
 
The present investigation explored the presence of illusory control in recreation-
al video poker players.  Using a multi-monitor computer which allowed for two 
different types of games to be presented concurrently, one on each monitor, 
players were allowed to freely choose which game they wished to play.  One 
option allowed for the player to select the cards they wished to hold and discard, 
while the other option was designed such that the computer automatically se-
lected the most probabilistically optimal sequence of cards to hold and discard.  
In the first experiment, two groups of ten participants were exposed to one of 
two rules (accurate or inaccurate) regarding the chances of winning.  No differ-
ences in response allocations between the games were found.  In the second 
experiment, thirteen participants were sequentially exposed to a non-rule base-
line followed by an inaccurate and subsequently accurate rule.  Twelve of the 
thirteen players preferred the self-selecting game, and following the introduction 
of an experimenter given rule that was designed to strengthen the illusion (i.e., 
that the self-selecting option was better), most players increased their preference 
for this option.  However, following the introduction of an experimenter given 
rule that attempted to weaken the illusion, only about half the participants fol-
lowed that rule and reduced playing the self-selecting option.  Variability across 
participants was able to be explained by examining each player’s verbal talk 
which was emitted overtly throughout the duration of the experiment.  Implica-
tions for understanding the illusion of control and the verbal behavior of gam-
blers are presented. 
Keywords: risk taking, gambler’s fallacy, protocol analysis, video poker, 
rule-governed behavior. 
____________________ 
 
Changing forms of gambling continue to 
evolve with the advent of computer technolo-
gy.  One of the most popular forms of gam-
bling, the three reel slot machine, is slowing 
being replaced with computerized versions 
consisting of a video display of virtual reels, 
many times with more than the original three 
(MacLin, Dixon & Hayes, 1999).  Payoffs are 
possible on the traditional middle display line, 
along with permutations of diagonals, top 
__________ 
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line, bottom line, and so on. Other slot ma-
chines incorporate “higher level” wagering 
possibilities whereby gamblers, after obtain-
ing a given display on the reels, have an op-
portunity to take additional chances by spin-
ning a wheel or selecting items from a video 
display (MacLin et al., 1999).  Computer 
technology has not only advanced the charac-
teristics of the slot machine, it has also al-
lowed for table games to be played by anyone 
individually using a computer terminal.  
Computerized versions of blackjack, roulette, 
and craps can be found in various casinos 
throughout the world.  The most popular 
computerized table game however, is video 
poker.  In fact, video poker continues to grow 
in popularity in many states year after year, 
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while slot machine play remains relatively 
constant (Ghezzi, Lyons, & Dixon, 2000).       
Video poker offers players a unique feature 
the traditional slot machine does not possess.  
This feature is the ability to select cards from 
the initially dealt cards which then can be 
held or discarded in hopes of changing the 
chances at a winning hand.  The ability to 
select cards crates somewhat of an illusion for 
the player, the illusion that with enough prac-
tice or skill they will be able to “beat” the 
game.  In reality, given the payout structure of 
most video poker games, not even the best 
video poker strategy can keep a player from 
losing money in the long run.  Instead the 
optimal strategy can do no more than slow 
down the losing process.  
The perceived ability to alter chance cir-
cumstances has been termed the “Illusion of 
Control” (Langer, 1975) and this phenomenon 
has been recognized by psychological re-
searchers studying gambling for some time 
(Dixon, Hayes, & Ebbs, 1998; Dixon, 2000).  
Perceptions, or illusions, of control have been 
shown to alter individual’s behavior in clearly 
observable ways.  For example, Dixon et al. 
(1998) showed that when roulette players 
were given the opportunity to wager chips on 
self-selected numbers or experimenter-
selected numbers, all players chose to select 
their own numbers.  In reality, there was no 
logical reason for a preference for one option 
over another as the outcome of a gamble at 
roulette is random.  No number has any better 
chance of being “hit” than any other.  Interes-
tingly, in this study the roulette players chose 
to select their own numbers even when they 
were required to forfeit chips in order to do 
so, thus illustrating the strength of illusionary 
control.    Other researchers have shown that 
gamblers will wager more, take larger risks, 
or both (Dixon, 2000) when under the belief 
they have control over game outcomes.   
 A preference for illusionary control may 
be detrimental to the gambler.  First, the play-
er may seek out gambling opportunities which 
possess illusionary characteristics over those 
that do not, and as a result may gamble for 
longer periods of time, thus risking and prob-
ably losing more money than initially ex-
pected or budgeted.  Second, the player may 
believe their own idiosyncratic strategy of 
responding may be able to somehow beat the 
house, when in fact, it actually contains many 
probabilistic flaws and errors in judgment.  
Treatment of pathological gamblers often 
targets attempting to reduce the client’s ten-
dency to engage in illusionary control as part 
of the recovery process (Petry, 2005). 
A debate in the published literature appears 
to exist as to if the illusion of control is a 
personality characteristic of a gambler (e.g., 
Knee & Zuckerman, 1998; Kroeber, 1992; 
Taylor & Brown, 1988) or simply an illogical 
rule or description of how the world works 
which, thorough appropriate conditioning, can 
be altered (Presson, & Denassi, 1996; Dixon, 
et al., 1998; Chau & Phillips, 1995; Ladou-
ceur & Sevigny, 2005).  The findings of Di-
xon, (2000) suggest that players will indeed 
reduce their tendency towards illusionary 
control when given a set of strategies by the 
experimenter.  Yet the Dixon, (2000) findings 
were preliminary and only may hold for rou-
lette players.  The degree to which an individ-
ual video poker gambler may reduce illusio-
nary control is still rather unclear, and further 
more it is unknown to what degree strategies 
or rules that the gambler him/herself might be 
saying internally to them could impact the 
ability for an experimenter’s (or clinician’s) 
instructions to take hold of behavior.  As 
video poker continues to rise in popularity, 
and more and more persons each year are 
being diagnosed for problem gambling (Di-
xon & Schreiber, 2002), it seems that a logi-
cal step would be to evaluate the relative 
preference for illusionary control of a group 
of video poker players, give them accurate 
rules or instructions that the illusion is just 
that – an illusion, and see how performance 
may change.  Furthermore, because a gambler 
92 MARK R. DIXON et al. 
does not just wait for someone else to tell 
them what to do, they must in fact be telling 
themselves how best to play the game at any 
given time.  Understanding the illusion with-
out incorporating the gambler’s own thoughts 
and rules about play appears incomplete, and 
thus must be included in any comprehensive 
analysis.  
There are a variety of means by which an 
experimenter might tap into the self-talk or 
self-generated strategies that may govern an 
individual while they gamble.  One might ask 
the individual, upon completion of play, what 
the reasons for doing the things they did were.  
The researcher could ask how they played, 
why they played, and why they quit.  Yet, 
while appearing straightforward, such tech-
niques often yield less than promising results.  
Instead, many subjects queried by these me-
thods fail to recall accurately what in fact 
governed their performance (Dixon & Schri-
ber, 2002).  Another method for assessing 
self-generated strategies of a gambler is to 
take a running transcription of their own self-
dialogue during an entire gambling episode.  
This technique is called “Protocol Analysis” 
(Ericsson & Simon, 1993) and essentially 
involves having the subject speak aloud eve-
rything they are thinking to themselves.  For 
over twenty years much discovery has come 
from using the protocol analysis technique 
outside of gambling (e.g., Dixon & Hayes, 
1998; Hayes, 1986), and therefore seems 
promising to apply it within a gambling con-
text to examine the strategies utilized by indi-
vidual players.   
Therefore the purpose of the present study 
was to conduct an experimental analysis of 
the illusion of control between groups of 
gamblers, as well as within individual gam-
blers playing a computerized version of video 
poker.  The first experiment investigated the 
impact of an experimenter delivered rule that 
was either accurate or inaccurate on perfor-
mance across groups of participants.  It was 
hypothesized that participants whom were 
given an accurate rule about the game would       
follow the rule and demonstrate less of an 
illusion of control. 
The second experiment further explored 
the role of instructions to alter the illusion of 
control by utilizing a single subject design 
that allowed for successive presentation of 
rule types within an individual participant.  
The experimental analysis in the second expe-
riment described above, was supplemented by 
the utilization of a protocol analysis which 
allowed for an examination of the self-
generated rules or strategies that a player may 
have while playing video poker as well as 
how those rules might verbalize the illusion of 
control.  It was hypothesized that all players 
when given the choice between a video poker 
game that allowed for card selection and a 
game that did not permit card selection, that 
all players would favor the option that al-
lowed selection – thus demonstrating an illu-
sion of control.  After the introduction of 
inaccurate rules about the game, essentially 
attempting to strengthen the illusion of con-
trol, it was hypothesized that players would 
favor the illusionary poker game even more 
so.  Finally, it was hypothesized that upon 
receiving more accurate rules about the poker 
game, and that the illusion of control really 
was just an illusion, which players would find 
the two poker games equally favored.  It was 
also believed that each individual player’s 
self-rules may mitigate our experimenter 
delivered rules, thus making the original hy-
potheses about game preference only initial 
and tentative.   
 
EXPERIMENT 1  
METHOD 
Participants 
Twenty undergraduates from a large Mid-
western university participated in the hour 
long study for course extra-credit and a 
chance for a monetary bonus based upon 
performance.  Demographic information was 
recorded for 17 of the 20 participants (remain-
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ing three were lost due to experimenter fail-
ure).  Random assignment of participants to 
two experimental groups yielded: Group 1 (7 
female, 1 male, 2 w/o data,  6 w/ associates 
degrees, 2 High School/GED, 2 unknown, 7 
with incomes < $10,000, 1 $20,000-$30,000, 
1 $30,000-$40,000 USD, 2 unknown, Mean 
Age = 24 years; SD = 6.7); Group 2 (7 fe-
male, 2 male, 1 w/o data,  7 w/ associates 
degrees, 2 High School/GED, 1 unknown,  6 
with incomes < $10,000, 1 $20000-$30000, 1 
> $50,000 USD, Mean Age = 22 years (SD = 
0.7). 
 
Setting, Materials, & Apparatus 
All experimental sessions took place in a 
10 ft by 10 ft room which contained a variety 
of microcomputers and office furniture.  Par-
ticipants were run on the current experiment 
individually, and no other person was in the 
experimental room during the running of any 
participant.  A video camera was located 
directly behind the participant who was seated 
at a 5 ft by 3 ft desk containing one micro-
computer and two 20” video monitors.   
All experimental procedures were pro-
grammed on a Windows XP capable micro-
computer.  A second video card was installed 
on the computer which allowed for a two 
monitor display.  A two monitor display func-
tions identical to a standard one monitor dis-
play with the added ability of opening and 
interacting with a second piece of computer 
software on the second monitor which may be 
different (or identical) to the software dis-
played on a single monitor.  A demographics 
survey, the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS; Leisure & Bloome, 1987), and the 
Gambling Functional Assessment (GFA; 
Dixon & Johnson, 2007) were presented in 
electronic formats programmed in Microsoft 
Visual Basic 2005.  The commercially availa-
ble video poker software “Bob Dancer’s Win 
Poker (Dancer, 2004) was installed on the 
experimental computer and was opened twice 
– once on each of the two monitors that were 
used in the present study.  The game “Deuces 
Wild” was used for both instances of Win-
Poker.  This version of video poker consists 
of a single line game of 5 card draw poker in 
which 2s can be used as wild cards and fea-
tures a payout structure that results in a pay-
back percentage of 100.7620% for perfect 
play.  One instance was set to Autohold the 
correct cards on all hands, while the other was 
setup so that participants could choose which 
cards to hold.  These two instances of the 
software will be referred to as the Autohold 
and Free Play instances respectively through-
out this paper. 
 
Procedure 
Participant assignment to rule groups and 
the left right position of the Autohold and 
Free Play instances of WinPoker were deter-
mined by a random drawing in the following 
manner.  20 slips of paper were placed in a 
cup, with 10 with the text rule 1, 10 with the 
text rule 2, with 5 slips in each group with the 
Text Autohold Left and 5 slips in each group 
with the Text Autohold Right.     
Upon completion of an informed consent 
participants were assigned to a rule group by 
the methods described above.  Participants 
then completed the SOGS and GFA before 
the two instances of WinPoker were opened.  
Participants were supplied with 300 credits on 
both instances of video poker and given the 
following instructions via the experimenter:  
 
Before you are two screens showing a video 
poker game. On one screen, the computer is set 
to choose your cards for you (indicate which 
screen this is to the participant) and the other is 
set so you can choose your own cards (tell them 
which screen). Your task is play a game of pok-
er. You can play hands on either of the screens 
at any time, but please play on only one screen 
at a time. For example, you could play one hand 
on the left screen, and the next hand on the right 
screen. 
 
Imagine that you have two machines in front of 
you. You may choose to play some hands on 
one machine, and some hands on the other 
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Figure 1: Screen capture of the session analysis window. 
 
machine,  but it would be difficult to play both 
at the same time. Similarly, you can play as 
many hands on one screen as you choose, and 
you can switch over and play on the other 
screen at any time, and keep on switching back 
and forth if you wish. Just play on one screen at 
a time.  
To play the game, you need to make a bet of 
coins. You can choose to bet up to five coins at 
a time. The screen shows the return on the bets 
you make if you win with a certain hand of 
cards. To make a bet, click on the bet one coin 
button, up to a maximum of five times, or press 
the max bet button. The maximum number of 
credits you can bet at a time is 5. Then, press 
the deal/draw button.” 
 
The computer will deal you five cards. You will 
then choose to hold cards that you want to keep. 
To hold cards, click on the cards that you wish 
to have held, or click on the HOLD buttons be-
neath those cards. After you have selected a 
card you wish to keep, press the DEAL/DRAW 
button. The cards that you have chosen to hold 
will remain in your hand, and the others will be 
discarded. Then, click on the deal/draw button 
again.  
 
On the free play screen, you may choose to hold 
whatever cards you want to. On the autohold 
screen, you don’t need to choose which cards to 
hold, as the computer does it for you. (Indicate 
which screen is which.)  
 
After the instructions participants were 
read the following rule based on the rule 
group to which they were assigned: 
95 ILLUSION OF CONTROL 
 
Inaccurate Rule:  
“If you pick your own cards, you have a better 
chance of winning.” 
 
Accurate Rule:  
“The computer does not make mistakes and can 
increase your chances of winning.” 
 
Participants were then instructed to play 100 
hands across the two instances of video poker.  
Participants could freely switch between the 
Autohold and Free Play instances of video 
poker with the only stipulation being that they 
complete the hand on the instance they were 
currently playing prior to switching.  Upon 
the completion of a total of 100 hands across 
the two video poker games, participants were 
debriefed on the purpose of the study and 
thanked for their participation.  The experi-
menter then recorded data from the session 
analysis screens of both video poker games 
including the number of hands played on both 
the Autohold and Free Play instances of video 
poker, percentage correct play, number of 
errors made, coins played, coins won, and 
payback percentage. 
 
Dependent Variable Integrity 
 All data were either collected directly by 
the software program which later was record-
ed by an experimenter.  The number of trials 
played on each screen, number of errors 
made, defined as deviations from statistically 
optimal plays, and other performance charac-
teristics were produced by the poker game 
and displayed in a “Session Analysis” after 
the player completed the experiment.  An 
example of a Session Analysis is found in 
Figure 1. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 A one-way Analysis of Variance with 
rule group as the factor revealed no signifi-
cant differences between groups for age, F(1, 
16) = .735, p = .405, SOGS score, F(1, 17) = 
.000, p = 1.000, GFA Sensory function, F(1, 
17) = .248, p = .626, GFA Escape function, 
F(1, 17) = .197, p = .663, GFA Attention 
function, F(1, 17) = 1.181, p = .239, or GFA 
tangible function, F(1, 17) = .120, p = .734, 
suggesting that the makeup of the two groups 
did not differ in any significant way. 
 The number of coins played and won for 
all participants in each group on each of the 
two poker games is presented in Table 1.  In 
general, regardless of the rule given, partici-
pants played more hands on the Free Play 
version of video poker, thus demonstrating a 
preference for the option which allowed them 
to select their own cards.  Participants in 
Group 1 averaged 21.10 hands (SD = 32.729) 
and 78.90 hands (SD = 32.729) on the Auto-
hold and Free Play instances of video poker 
respectively.  Participants in Group 2 aver-
aged 23.20 hands (SD = 29.630) and 67.10 
hands (SD = 29.726) on the Autohold and 
Free Play instances of video poker respective-
ly.  Analysis of the mean differences for 
hands played on the Autohold and Free Play 
options using a one-way Analysis of Variance 
with rule group as the factor failed to reveal 
significant differences, Autohold: F(1, 19) = -
.751, p = .398, Free Play: F(1, 19) = .712, p 
=.410.  Figure 3 displays group means and 
standard error for all participants on the num-
ber of hands played for both the Autohold and 
Free Play instances of video poker. 
 The results of Experiment 1 failed to find 
any differences in the number of hands played 
on either the Autohold or the Free Play across 
groups regardless of the fact that one group 
was directly instructed that playing on the 
Autohold option would increase their chance 
of winning.  This result may suggest that self 
generated rules regarding one’s ability to 
better effect the outcome of hands by self 
selecting the cards, i.e. the illusion of control, 
may affect responding to a greater degree than 
experimenter delivered rules.  However, a fair 
degree of individual participant variability 
within a given participant group can be seen 
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Figure 2: Experiment 1 individual participant data for selection of the Free Play option. 
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 Figure 3: Experiment 2 individual participant data for selection of the Free Play option across baseline, inaccu-
rate, and accurate rule conditions. 
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Table 1 
Each Experiment 1 participant’s number of coins played / number of coins won across both the Autohold and Free 
Play games. 
Inaccurate Rule Group   Accurate Rule Group  
     
Participant Autohold Free Play  Participant Autohold Free Play 
1 45/50 455/320  2 1/1 105/109 
6 113/130 97/79  7 250/195 250/165 
4 500/480 0/0  8 169/146 0/0 
5 6/9 94/79  3 23/8 254/242 
9 0/0 493/523  11 26/39 442/351 
10 76/85 130/108  13 11/0 321/304 
12 0/0 242/222  17 150/90 350/255 
14 20/5 480/385  18 215/110 285/205 
15 20/30 480/385  19 44/20 69/68 
16 0/0 457/157  20 172/191 280/275 
       
 
 
Table 2 
Each Experiment 1 participant’s number of plays on the participant controls card selection (Free Play) number of 
probability errors during the experiment.  Percentages Correct play statistic shown in parentheses. 
Inaccurate Rule Group   Accurate Rule Group  
     
Participant Free Play   Participant Free Play  
1 91/52 (42.86%)   2 99/43 (56.57%)  
6 50/22 (56%)   7 50/28 (44%)  
4 0/0   8 0/0  
5 94/49 (47.89%)   3 90/50 (44.44%)  
9 100/53 (47%)   11 91/46 (49.45%)  
10 62/37 (40.32%)   13 95/29 (69.47%)  
12 100/45 (55%)   17 71/33 (53.52%)  
14 96/48 (50%)   18 57/22 (61.4%)  
15 96/40 (58.33%)   19 62/36 (41.94%)  
16 100/95 (5%)   20 56/16 (71.43%)  
       
 
in Figure 3.  In summary, some participants 
within a group followed the rule to a greater 
degree than other participants within the 
group. From analysis of Table 1 and 2, these 
differences in response allocation appear 
unaccounted for by greater reinforcement 
probability on one option over another.  It is 
possible that some participants believed the 
rule given by the experimenter to a greater 
degree than others did, that perhaps a type of 
self-generated rule was created by the partici-
pant that directed performance differently 
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than what would be predicted by the experi-
menter delivered rule, or had stronger illu-
sions of control than others.  Experiment 2 
attempted to further explore these issues in 
more detail by exposing each participant to 
various rule-types and concurrently recording 
self-generated rules via a talk-aloud proce-
dure. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2  
METHOD 
Participants, Setting, and Apparatus 
 Thirteen college undergraduate students 
who expressed an interest in gambling and 
had a history of playing video poker partici-
pated in the current study.  No participants 
were actively seeking treatment for problems 
with excessive gambling.   All experimental 
sessions took place in a 10 ft by 10 ft room 
which contained a variety of microcomputers 
and office furniture.  Participants were run on 
the current experiment individually, and no 
other person was in the experimental room 
during the running of any participant.  A vid-
eo camera was located directly behind the 
participant who was seated at a 5 ft by 3 ft 
desk containing one microcomputer and two 
17 in video monitors.   
 
Procedures 
Win Poker was set to run the standard 5 
card draw poker game on both monitors, and 
on the right monitor it was set with the para-
meters of 100 coins and the “Autohold” fea-
ture enabled.  This Autohold feature allowed 
for the player to have the computer select the 
optimal cards to be held and discarded upon 
the dealing of the initial 5 cards of the poker 
hand.  Win Poker was set on the left monitor 
to run with 100 coins and the “Autohold” 
feature disabled.  The disabling of this feature 
resulted in Win Poker operating identically to 
that of a commercially available draw poker 
game whereby upon the dealing of the initial 
5 cards, the player was able to select which 
cards he/she wished to hold and discard prior 
to the remaining cards being dealt by the 
computer.  Both versions of Win Poker were 
fair probability 1 deck of 52 cards.  The par-
ticipant in the experiment was able to move 
the computer mouse freely between the two 
instances of the game.  Figure 4 displays an 
example of the video poker game. 
Upon completing a consent form to partic-
ipate in the present study, all participants 
were instructed that the computer in front of 
them was designed such that they could play 
either video poker game they saw displayed 
on the two monitors.  On the left monitor, 
they could select which cards they wanted to 
hold and discard, while on the right monitor, 
the computer would select the cards for them. 
The participants were then told to try and earn 
as many points as possible, as the high score 
for the experiment would result in a cash 
prize from the researchers.  All participants 
were additionally compensated with course 
extra credit for completing the experiment.  
The entire experiment lasted no longer than 1 
hour. 
Baseline.  All 13 participants were ex-
posed to varying lengths of baseline contin-
gencies which consisted of five “test” plays 
on each plays in which they could switch 
back and forth between monitors and play 
whichever they preferred. The rationale for 
exposing participants to varying lengths of 
baseline conditions was to control for the 
potential violations of internal validity which 
could occur if participants were all exposed to 
the same number of baseline trials.  For ex-
ample, if all were exposed to baseline for 30 
trials, then on the 31
st
 trial changes were 
shown when a new condition was instated, the 
change in condition the change in conditions is 
confounded with the length of baseline; as 
something might happen to a poker player 
after 30 trials.  The varying lengths of base-
line used in the present experiment is more 
formally noted as a “non- concurrent multiple 
baseline across subjects” research design 
(Bloome, Fisher, & Orme, 1999), and has 
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Figure 4. Screen capture of the game play screen. 
 
been used previously in some previous gam-
bling studies (i.e., Dixon, 2000). 
Inaccurate Rules.  Following each partici-
pant’s individualized number of baseline 
trials, an inaccurate rule condition was in-
stated whereby the experimenter re-entered 
the room and stated to the participant: “If you 
pick your own cards you have a better chance 
of winning.” These instructions were repeated 
if the participant had any additional questions, 
but were not elaborated on by the experimen-
ter.  A copy of the instructions was posted 
above the computer screen on a piece of pa-
per.  Each participant was then instructed to 
once again play the two poker games freely 
and was told to continue playing until the 
experimenter re-entered the room.  As in the 
baseline conditions, each participant was 
exposed to an individual amount of trials 
during this condition with a range of around 
40 trials.  No alterations of any type were 
made to the computer interface, thus the con-
sequences of playing each game were identic-
al as they were during baseline. 
 Accurate Rules.  Following each partici-
pant’s inaccurate rule trial exposure, the expe-
rimenter re-entered the room and stated to the 
participant: “The computer does not make 
mistakes and can increase your odds of win-
ning.”  These instructions were repeated if the 
participant had any additional questions, but 
were not elaborated on by the experimenter.  
A copy of the instructions was posted above 
the computer screen on a piece of paper.  
Each participant was then instructed to once 
again play the two poker games freely and 
was told to continue playing until the experi-
menter re-entered the room.  As in the pre-
vious conditions, each participant was ex-
posed to an individual amount of trials during 
this condition with a range of around 40 trials.  
No alterations of any type were made to the 
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computer interface, thus the consequences of 
playing each game were identical as they 
were during baseline and inaccurate rules. 
 Talk-Aloud.  At the onset of the experi-
ment, prior to exposure to baseline conditions, 
all participants were instructed to speak aloud 
everything that they were thinking during the 
entire experiment.  They were told a video 
camera would be behind them, capturing their 
play, and recording their voice.  Participants 
were also informed that if they were quiet for 
too long they would be required to start the 
experiment over again.  The experimenter 
assured the participant there was no right or 
wrong thing to say, and that they should just 
say anything that was on their mind. 
 
Dependent Variable Integrity 
 All data were collected as described in 
Experiment 1.  Participants were not shown 
the session analysis data between experimen-
tal phases, but were asked to look at the back 
of the room, while the experimenter prepared 
the next experimental condition.  A video 
camera was also used to capture the talking-
aloud of each participant.  Each resulting 
verbal behavior was transcribed word-for-
word by an experimenter.  Following the 
transcription, independent clauses were classi-
fied into the following categories: 
 
1. Statements regarding the participant’s per-
formance.  For example, “I am going to 
hold the 10 and the Jack”, or “I am hitting 
the Draw button right now.” 
2. Statements regarding reinforcement.  For 
example, “I just won five coins”, “That 
was a good hand”, or “No win on that 
game.” 
3. Statements related to forecasting the up-
coming game outcome.  For example “I 
need a Jack.”, or “Come on 2 Queens 
please.” 
4. Inaccurate rules about Video Poker.  For 
example, “It has been a while since I won, 
so a win is sure to come.”, or “This game 
always gives me Aces.” 
5. Accurate rules about Video Poker.  For 
example, “It does not matter what cards 
you like, the game is random.”, or “Each 
trial is independent of the next.” 
6. Comments directly related to the illusion 
of control.  For example, “I need to stay on 
the left game because I can do better than 
the computer”, or “I pick better cards than 
the computer can on the right screen.” 
7. Comments unrelated to the game.  For ex-
ample, “It is hot in here.”, “The experi-
menter is cute.”, or “I need to eat lunch.” 
 
Inter-observer reliability was assessed on 
five sessions whereby a second independent 
observer coded the transcripts themselves 
and then this new coding was compared to 
the original observer’s classifications.  No 
changes were made post-hoc to either 
observer’s classification, and the degree to 
which they agreed was assessed.  The 
resulting overall agreement between the 
two observers was 89%, and was calcu-
lated by dividing the number of agree-
ments (for each trial) by the number of 
agreements plus disagreements, thus sug-
gesting high reliability in protocol content 
classification.   
 
EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS AND 
DISCUSSION 
 Table 3 displays a summary of the con-
tingencies which all participants in the expe-
riment were exposed to.  The left screen, or 
Free Play, option allowed the participant to 
select their own cards which would be held or 
discarded, while the right screen, the Auto-
hold option, auto-selected the optimal card 
combination.  Each participant played both 
screens from time to time, but in general, 
every participant preferred the left computer 
screen over the right screen.  The only excep-
tion to this pattern across participants was 
#13.  The second number depicted in each cell 
of the Table 3 is the number of coins won.  In 
general, participants played more coins than 
they won.  As with commercial video poker, 
in the long run, all players would lose coins.  
Table 4 depicts only the trials which were 
played on the left screen, or the participant 
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Table 3 
Each Experiment 2 participant’s number of plays per game (Free Play; Autohold) / number of coins won during the 
three conditions of the experiment; baseline, inaccurate rule, and accurate rule. 
Participant Baseline 
Free Play 
Baseline 
Autohold 
Inaccurate 
Free Play 
Inaccurate 
Autohold 
Accurate 
Free Play 
Accurate 
Autohold 
2 72/82 12/6 41/29 0/0 42/72 0/0 
3 66/36 0/0 40/40 0/0 0/0 43/34 
4 27/37 8/4 38/44 0/0 27/18 18/11 
5 19/19 1/1 42/38 2/0 58/50 0/0 
6 61/61 19/14 40/24 5/1 18/18 22/29 
7 71/66 20/24 47/46 0/0 2/0 39/41 
8 134/74 27/23 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
9 42/23 5/2 42/42 0/0/ 53/53 2/2 
10 64/78 18/43 42/47 2/4 35/41 6/4 
11 65/46 0/0 39/49 0/0 47/27 0/0 
12 24/12 19/27 40/25 7/1 44/33 3/6 
13 57/42 109/102 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
14 105/117 55/49 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
 
card selecting game.  In addition, this Table 
highlights the number of probability errors 
that were made by the participant during each 
experimental condition.  Interestingly, all 
participants made a fair number of errors, 
ranging from 21% to 98% of trials with an 
error, thus their overall winnings during this 
experiment were drastically reduced due to 
participants frequently making card selections 
which were not statistically optimal.  
The Wilcoxon Signed Rank test for ordin-
al data was used to compare the percent-age 
of trials played on the self selection screen 
during baseline and after the introduction of 
the inaccurate rule.  Results revealed a signif-
icant change in the percentage of hands 
played on the self selection screen (Z = -2.52, 
p = .012), indicating that participants played a 
significantly greater percentage of trials on 
the self selection screen following the inaccu-
rate rule stating that they could win more if 
they selected their own cards.  The Wilcoxon 
Signed Rank test for ordinal data was also 
used to compare the percentage of trials 
played on the self selection screen after the 
delivery of the inaccurate rule and after deli-
very of the accurate rule.  Results failed to 
reach significance (Z = -1.829, p = .069) indi-
cating that the introduction of an accurate rule 
stating that the computer did not make mis-
takes in selecting cards failed to significantly 
reduce or change the percentage of responses 
allocated to the self selection screen across all 
participants. 
The changing experimental conditions 
from baseline to Inaccurate Rule did impact 
all 10 participants’ behavior.  Participants 8, 
13, and 14 remained in Baseline throughout, 
to serve as experimental controls.  Figure 5 
depicts the clear preference for the left com-
puter screen by participants, and displays the 
percentages of selection for this option sepa-
rated by each experimental condition of the 
current study.  It can be seen from this figure 
that all participants increased their percentag-
es of play on the left computer screen follow-
ing the introduction of the Inaccurate rule 
condition.  The only exceptions are where 
there was already a 100% preference for this 
option during Baseline by a participant.  The 
changing experimental conditions from Inac-
curate Rule to Accurate Rule failed to yield as 
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Table 4 
Each participant’s number of plays on the participant controls card selection (Free Play) / number of probability 
errors during the three conditions of the experiment; baseline, inaccurate rule, and accurate rule.  Percentages of 
trials with errors are shown in parentheses. 
Participant Baseline Free 
Play 
 Inaccurate 
Free Play 
 Accurate 
Free Play 
 
2 72/27 (38%)  41/14 (34%)  42/14 (33%)  
3 66/41 (62%)  40/24 (60%)  0/0 (0%)  
4 27/9 (33%)  38/10 (26%)  27/7 (26%)  
5 19/8 (42%)  42/26 (62%)  58/33 (57%)  
6 61/24 (39%)  40/17 (43%)  18/6 (33%)  
7 71/66 (93%)  47/46 (98%)  2/0 (0%)  
8 134/94 (70%)  n/a  n/a  
9 42/9 (21%)  42/11 (26%)  53/14 (26%)  
10 64/23 (36%)  42/13 (31%)  35/14 (40%)  
11 65/32 (49%)  39/17 (44%)  47/22 (47%)  
12 24/16 (67%)  40/26 (65%)  44/34 (77%)  
13 57/36 (63%)  n/a  n/a  
14 105/50 (48%)  n/a  n/a  
 
robust of an effect across all participants.  
Upon introduction of the Accurate rule condi-
tion, participants 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, and 10 followed 
the rule given to them by the experimenter 
and decreased their playing of the left com-
puter screen, and participants 2, 5, 11, and 12 
continued to play the left computer screen at 
high rates even after given the rule by the 
experimenter.   These data show the strength 
of what an inaccurate rule about Video Poker 
can do to game preference, yet produced 
mixed results regarding accurate rules. 
 In order to further understand the ob-
served differences between participants dur-
ing the Accurate rule condition, verbal proto-
cols were analyzed phase by phase to assess 
individual participant differences.  Tables 5-7 
display the summary data by experimental 
condition for each participant.  Data were 
classified into 7 content categories with the 
measurement unit of the independent clause 
rather than a sentence, which might contain 
two or more clauses.  As a result, each trial 
may have contained one or more content 
emissions.  In general, all participants spoke 
primarily about performance or reinforcement 
during all experimental conditions.   
Using the obtained data in Figure 5 and con-
ventions established in previous work on rule 
following (Wulfert, Greenway, Farkas, Hayes 
& Dougher, 1994), participants’ verbal proto-
cols were either classified as “Rule Follow-
ers” or “Non-Rule Followers” depending on if 
their percentages of selection for the left 
computer screen increased or decreased dur-
ing the final condition of the experiment.  
Using this classification of participants, mean 
verbal utterances were computed for each 
group and are displayed in Table 8.  The ob-
tained data suggest differences between the 
Rule Followers and Non-Rule Followers’ 
verbal behavior. Rule Followers talked less 
about performance than the Non-Rule Fol-
lowers, talked more about reinforcement, and 
also emitted more irrelevant statements about 
the game.  Rule Followers also tended to 
speak more often about accurate rules about 
the game, and emit statements about illusory 
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Figure 5: Experiment 2 individual participant data for selection of the Free Play option across baseline, inaccurate, 
and accurate rule conditions. 
 
 
Table 5 
Verbal protocol analysis summary data for each participant during the baseline conditions of the present experiment.  
Values are depicted in percentages of total verbal behavior emitted in each category. 
Participant Performance Reinforce- 
ment 
For- 
casting 
Inacc. 
Rules 
Acc. 
Rules 
Illusion Unrelated 
2 59 23 7 0 0 0 11 
3 100 21 0 0 0 0 1 
4 48 33 15 1 0 0 3 
5 46 49 3 0 0 0 3 
6 35 23 10 13 1 0 18 
7 49 31 6 1 1 1 11 
8 14 49 2 4 0 1 1 
9 42 41 15 0 1 0 2 
10 41 47 3 2 0 0 5 
11 68 22 5 0 0 0 1 
12 86 7 0 0 0 0 7 
13 37 41 9 0 5 0 17 
14 24 35 6 1 2 0 0 
Mean 46 30 6 2 1 0 6 
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Table 6 
Verbal protocol analysis summary data for each participant during the inaccurate rule conditions of the present 
experiment.  Values are depicted in percentages of total verbal behavior emitted in each category. 
Participant Performance Reinforce- 
ment 
For- 
casting  
Inacc. 
Rules 
Acc. 
Rules 
Illusion Unrelated 
2 47 31 10 6 0 0 7 
3 100 16 2 2 0 0 0 
4 52 34 9 3 0 0 2 
5 42 47 9 2 0 0 0 
6 18 27 4 7 2 5 38 
7 40 27 11 5 0 1 16 
9 42 40 9 0 5 0 5 
10 51 41 5 0 0 3 3 
11 65 30 2 5 0 0 0 
12 80 16 0 4 0 0 0 
Mean 49 28 6 3 1 1 6 
Note: Participants 8, 13 and 14 remained in baseline throughout the entire experiment, thus they are not depicted in 
the below table. 
 
 
Table 7 
Verbal protocol analysis summary data for each participant during the accurate rule conditions of the present expe-
riment.  Values are depicted in percentages of total verbal behavior emitted in each category. 
Participant Performance Reinforce- 
ment 
For- 
casting  
Inacc. 
Rules 
Acc. 
Rules 
Illusion Unrelated 
        
2 62 23 0 2 0 2 11 
3 39 39 0 2 4 4 9 
4 45 42 6 4 0 1 2 
5 43 46 7 0 1 2 1 
6 19 28 5 5 7 9 28 
7 41 27 7 0 7 7 14 
9 44 38 0 1 2 9 2 
10 41 38 6 1 1 4 9 
11 66 32 0 0 0 2 0 
12 72 14 3 2 0 5 0 
Mean 43 30 3 2 2 4 7 
Note: Participants 8, 13 and 14 remained in baseline throughout the entire experiment, thus they are not depicted in 
the below table. 
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Table 8 
Mean percentages of verbal behavior content in each category displayed for participants that followed the accurate 
rule during the final condition of the experiment. 
 
Condition Group Perfor-
mance 
Rein- 
forcement 
Fore- 
casting 
Inacc. Acc. Illusion Unrelated 
         
Baseline Rule 
Followers 
0.525 0.326 0.081 0.028 0.005 0.001 0.066 
 Non Rule 
Followers 
0.647 0.252 0.037 0 0 0 0.055 
         
Inaccurate 
Rules 
Rule 
Followers 
0.500 0.336 0.065 0.028 0.011 0.013 0.088 
 Non Rule 
Followers 
0.612 0.297 0.057 0.032 0 0 0.005 
         
Accurate 
Rules 
Rule 
Followers 
0.413 0.353 0.030 0.018 0.025 0.050 0.100 
 Non Rule 
Followers 
0.587 0.312 0.040 0.025 0 0.022 0.005 
 
control.  These group mean differences were   
consistent across all experimental conditions.  
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Taken together, the two studies presented 
here have explored the degree to which an 
illusion of control exists for video poker play-
ers, and how instructional stimuli may miti-
gate that illusion.  In Experiment 1, we em-
ployed a group design to explore the differen-
tial effects of accurate and inaccurate rules on 
which type of game participants would allot 
the majority of their responses to.  There were 
slight differences between groups, yet in gen-
eral results showed that regardless of the rule 
given, most participants played the majority 
of trials on the game which allowed them to 
select cards themselves.  These results indi-
cate that a preference for illusory control may 
exist for video poker players, even when such 
a preference results in play that deviates from 
the statistically optimal. 
The second study further examined the ex-
tent to which recreational video poker players 
would prefer a game which allowed player 
card selection over a game which had the 
computer control card selection, even when 
the computer option would result in statisti-
cally optimal play, and thus more winning 
games. In baseline of Experiment 2, 12 of 13 
players preferred the self-selected card game.  
These findings suggest that the illusion of 
control (Langer, 1975) does in fact exist for 
the majority of video poker players, even 
when that illusion is detrimental to overall 
obtained winnings.  No player in our study 
played statistically optimal, thus preference 
for the illusionary option had detrimental 
effects on overall winnings.  These findings 
add to the published literature on illusionary 
control in gambling (Dixon, 2000; Dixon, 
Hayes, & Ebbs, 1998; Presson, & Denassi, 
1996), and suggest that control is highly pre-
ferred even if the odds of a positive outcome 
are reduced by its presence.  Future research 
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might wish to add economic variables to the 
current study whereby players might need to 
wager more for identical outcomes if they 
want the illusionary option, or the payoffs for 
winning poker hands are less than they are for 
the computer controlled game.  It may have 
also been possible that our participants pre-
ferred the illusionary game option because it 
was simply somewhat more entertaining or 
“fun” than just having the computer select 
cards for them.  A future study may also at-
tempt to control for this possible confound by 
making the card selection of our computer 
controlled option coupled with a concurrent 
task the participant would do during the trial 
time (e.g., like clicking the computer mouse 
on a section of the computer screen).   
Of greater interest in this current investiga-
tion is the impact that experimenter delivered 
instructions had on resulting gambling beha-
vior of our video poker players.  Upon the 
delayed introduction of an experimenter rule 
about how the computer selected option was 
not an ideal choice, all of our participants 
increased the percentage in which they played 
the illusionary game option.  These findings 
support the ability to experimentally modulate 
the illusion of control which was demonstrat-
ed in roulette players by Dixon (2000).  Thus 
it appears very clear that when given informa-
tion by others that illusionary behavior should 
be engaged in, video poker players will in-
crease their tendency to do so.  In our study 
we only gave our participants a one sentence 
rule about playing the illusionary option.  
Imagine the extensive rules that a real poker 
player is exposed to upon entry into a casino.  
Other players tell him or her to try this or do 
that, or play a game that is hot and stay away 
from one that is not.  Such rules are more 
elaborate than the ones used in the current 
study, and it appears possible that their com-
plexity may result in even greater desire of 
poker players to engage in illusionary control.  
Future research should explore the incorpora-
tion of more detailed inaccurate rules which 
are designed to strengthen illusionary control 
than the one sentence rule used in the current 
investigation.  While some notions of the 
illusion of control suggest that it is a static 
fallacy or trait, our data in fact suggest that 
this construct can be modified through expe-
rimental manipulations. 
It should also be noted that the order of the 
rules given could possibly have had an impact 
on the obtained results.  In the current study 
the Inaccurate rule condition preceded the 
Accurate rule condition for all participants.   
While this same order has been used in pre-
vious research on the illusion of control (Di-
xon, 2000), it is possible that the contradiction 
implied by presenting an accurate rule after 
first presenting an inaccurate rule may have 
contributed to the obtained results.  Future 
studies may address this limitation by coun-
terbalancing the presentation of inaccurate 
and accurate rules across participants.  Future 
studies may also consider randomizing the 
position of computer monitors across subjects 
such that a position bias may be experimental-
ly controlled for. 
The rather simple rule used in the present 
study may have also been in part responsible 
for the relatively mixed findings obtained 
during the accurate rule condition of the 
present investigation.  The fact that such a 
simple rule could alter 6 of our 10 experimen-
tal participants suggests that this minimal 
intervention could result in behavior change 
for a fair number of our participants.  The 
deviations obtained between participants were 
clarified when conducting more detailed in-
vestigations of each participant’s verbal beha-
vior.  Without the inclusion of our protocol 
analysis data, we would have been unable to 
account for variations.  Yet, though our incor-
poration of the protocol analysis we were able 
to determine that there were some subtle dif-
ferences between those participants that fol-
lowed the accurate rule and those that did not.  
Our classification of participants’ verbal be-
havior into those that followed the rule and 
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those that did not revealed small, but interest-
ing differences between these two participant 
groups.  First, the rule following participants 
talked less about performance and more about 
reinforcement.  This finding suggests that 
perhaps gamblers who are very attentive to 
their current financial standing on a game are 
more prone to follow the advice of others.  
Our experimenter may have been perceived as 
an expert of sorts, and those players who 
wished to maximize their winnings tended to 
follow the directions.  Those participants who 
did not follow the experimenter given accu-
rate rule tended to talk more about their trial 
by trial performance.  It is possible that these 
participants may have been somewhat less 
attentive to their winnings and losses, and 
instead were interested primarily in the cards 
they had in hand.  Perhaps the lack of atten-
tion to the current financial standing is a fea-
ture which results in continued preference for 
illusionary control, when in fact, that control 
can be working against the player in terms of 
potential winnings.  As was seen by all our 
participants, the illusion did cost the player 
potential winnings, as the many errors made 
could have been prevented by selecting the 
computer controlled game option. 
In summary, the illusion of control is 
present in many video poker players.  As 
opposed to other gambling contexts which the 
illusion may do no harm to the player (e.g., 
selecting one’s own numbers at roulette or 
keno), self-selecting cards at video poker 
often result in errors from probabilistically 
optimal play.  While computer selected card 
games are not available in many casinos, it 
remains clear that gamblers may seek out 
gaming devices which allow the illusion of 
control to be engaged in.  Rising numbers of 
video poker players and decreasing numbers 
of slot machine players suggest that changing 
game preferences could be partially accounted 
for by the illusionary characteristic of video 
poker.  
The present data are also promising first 
steps in designing potential treatment strate-
gies for problem gamblers.  If illusionary 
control can be brought under the persuasion 
of experimenter given rules about the game, 
then perhaps it can also be brought under the 
control of treatment providers seeking to 
reduce their clients’ excessive gambling.  Our 
data suggest that if gamblers begin to pay 
greater attention and think (or talk) about the 
wins and losses they encounter on a trial by 
trial basis, they may be more prone to follow 
the instructions of others.  When those in-
structions are from treatment providers, it 
may be possible that the problem gambler will 
be more apt to listening.  As the number of 
problem gamblers continues to increase and 
successful treatments are few, the time seems 
right to explore innovative means by which 
the treatment of this pathology can be en-
hanced.   
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MANIPULATING CONTEXTUAL CONTROL OVER SIMULATED 
SLOT MACHINE GAMBLING 
 
Alice Hoon & Simon Dymond 
University of Wales, Swansea 
 
James W. Jackson & Mark R. Dixon 
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Situational or contextual factors involved in slot machine gambling, such as 
colors, are assumed to play an important role in initiating and maintaining 
gambling. However, there is little empirical evidence for this assumption. The 
present study sought to investigate the effects of manipulating two contextual 
factors (the background colors of computer-simulated slot machines) on 
participants‟ responding to two concurrently available slot machines. Following 
a pretest, a nonarbitrary relational training and testing procedure was used to 
establish contextual functions of MORE-THAN and LESS-THAN for two cues. 
During posttest, participants allocated the majority of their responses to the slot 
machine that shared nonarbitrary properties with the contextual cue for MORE-
THAN, despite the identical payout probabilities of the slot machines. Overall, 
the present findings demonstrate that participants‟ preferences for one of two 
concurrently available slot machines may come under contextual control. The 
advantages of the present approach to investigating the role played by situational 
factors such as colors in maintaining slot machine gambling are discussed. 
Key words: situational factors, background colors, nonarbitrary relational 
training and testing, slot machines. 
____________________ 
 
 It is widely assumed that the situational 
or contextual factors involved in slot machine 
gambling, such as lights, colors, and sound 
effects, play an important role in either 
initiating or maintaining gambling (see Parke 
& Griffiths, 2006; in press). However, 
empirical support for these assumptions is 
limited. Indeed, a recent report by the British 
Medical Association (2006), highlighted that, 
although situational characteristics are 
“thought to influence vulnerable gamblers, 
__________ 
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there has been very little empirical research 
into these factors and more research is needed 
before any definitive conclusions can be made 
about the direct or indirect influence on 
gambling behaviour and whether vulnerable 
individuals are any more likely to be 
influenced…” (p. 13). Therefore, further 
research on the role played by contextual 
factors in initiating and maintaining gambling 
is needed. 
One way of manipulating contextual 
factors is to employ a laboratory simulated 
gambling task, such as a slot machine, and to 
vary features such as background colors while 
keeping all other aspects of the gambling 
environment constant. It may then be possible 
to identify occasions under which the 
contextual control exerted by such features 
influences the likelihood that gamblers come 
into contact with the programmed 
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contingencies. This was the approach adopted 
by the present study.  
Our aim was to investigate the effects of 
manipulating two contextual factors (the 
background colors of computer-simulated slot 
machines) on participants‟ responding to two 
concurrently available slot machines. 
Specifically, we sought to replicate and 
extend a previous study by Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006), who showed that contextual functions 
of more-than and less-than attached to two 
background contextual colors (yellow and 
blue, respectively) systematically altered 
participants‟ preferences for one of two 
concurrently available slot machines. 
Following a pretest assessment of 
participants‟ responding to two concurrently 
available slot machines that differed only in 
background color, participants received a 
nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
intervention that established the yellow and 
blue colors as contextual cues for MORE-
THAN and LESS-THAN responding, 
respectively. Specifically, selecting a 
comparison gambling stimulus (e.g., playing 
cards, U.S. money) of greater quantity than 
the sample was reinforced in the presence of a 
yellow background and selecting a 
comparison of a lesser quantity than the 
sample was reinforced in the presence of a 
blue background. Training was conducted 
using three stimulus sets and testing 
subsequently occurred with three novel sets 
without feedback. Then, during a posttest 
phase, Zlomke and Dixon showed that 
participants allocated more responding to the 
slot machine with the background color that 
had the contextual functions of MORE-
THAN, despite both machines having 
identical schedules and magnitudes of 
reinforcement. 
 The findings of Zlomke and Dixon 
provide empirical support for the role played 
by situational factors in maintaining slot 
machine gambling. Indeed, the effectiveness 
of the brief nonarbitrary relational training 
intervention suggests a novel way of further 
investigating the relational contextual 
involved in gambling functions (Dixon & 
Delaney, 2006; Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & 
Roche, 2001). Nonarbitrary relational training 
and testing procedures are a defining feature 
of research on multiple stimulus relations 
(e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1995; Roche & 
Dymond, in press; Whelan, Barnes-Holmes, 
& Dymond, 2006). Studying multiple 
stimulus relations first involves training 
specific functions for contextual cues using 
nonarbitrary stimuli related along formal, 
physical dimensions. Imagine, for example, 
that we wish to train and test the multiple 
stimulus relations of more-than and less-than. 
In the nonarbitrary training phase, a 
contextual cue, a sample, and two or more 
comparison stimuli are usually presented on 
each trial. For instance, Dymond and Barnes 
(1995) established three cues as contextual 
cues for the nonarbitrary relational functions 
of same, more-than and less-than, 
respectively, by reinforcing selections of 
stimuli of differing quantities depending on 
which cue was presented. For example, in the 
presence of the MORE-THAN cue, a 6-star 
sample, and 3-star and 9-star comparisons, 
selecting the 9-star comparison was 
reinforced. On the other hand, given this task 
arrangement, in the presence of the LESS-
THAN cue selecting the 3-star comparison 
was reinforced. Participants were trained in 
this manner with several stimulus sets and 
were tested with novel sets without feedback. 
The next stage in a study on multiple stimulus 
relations is to then employ the contextual cues 
to establish arbitrarily applicable relations 
among stimuli that are not formally related. 
However, because Zlomke and Dixon were 
only concerned with the first stage, we will 
not address the second, arbitrary stage (see 
Barnes-Holmes, Hayes, Dymond, & O‟Hora, 
2001; Dymond and Barnes, 1995). 
When training MORE-THAN and 
LESS-THAN cues it is important that 
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reinforcement is contingent on selecting 
comparisons that are physically more than 
and less than the sample stimuli, respectively 
(e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1995; Whelan et al., 
2006). Zlomke and Dixon used nonarbitrary 
stimulus sets consisting of gambling-relevant 
stimuli (e.g., playing cards) and monetary 
values (e.g., US dollar bills and coins). 
Similarly, it is important when training 
MORE-THAN and LESS-THAN that only 
two comparisons be used because if three 
comparisons of differing size are presented 
and selections of one are reinforced, the 
stimulus control governing the other two 
comparisons remains unspecified.  
A central feature of Zlomke and Dixon‟s 
procedure may, in fact, have contributed to 
their findings because during nonarbitrary 
relational training, three comparison stimuli 
were presented on each trial. As specified 
above, this is problematic because it may lead 
to the ambiguous situation in which, for 
example, given the MORE THAN cue with 
$5 as the sample and $1, $10 and $20 as the 
comparisons, there would be two correct 
choices (i.e., $10 and $20 are both more than 
the $1 sample). In order to address this, we set 
about systematically replicating Zlomke and 
Dixon (2006) using a nonarbitrary relational 
training and testing procedure in which two 
comparisons were presented on every trial. In 
what follows, we report the findings of three 
experiments that systematically manipulated 
features of the nonarbitrary relational training 
and testing phases in order to shift 
participants‟ preferences for one of two 
concurrently available slot machines. 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Six undergraduates (1 male, 5 female), 
with a mean age of 20.17 years (SD: 1.47), 
participated for course credit. All participants 
completed the South Oaks Gambling Screen 
(SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 1987), which is the 
most commonly used assessment instrument 
to reveal potential problems with gambling.  
Participants‟ SOGS scores ranged from 0-3 
(M: 0.67; SD: 1.21) indicating that none had a 
pathological gambling problem (i.e., a score 
of 5 or higher). 
 
Apparatus and Setting 
 The experiment was conducted in a small 
room containing a computer programmed in 
Visual Basic 2005 that controlled all stimulus 
presentations and recorded all responses. The 
first author (A.H) recruited participants and 
conducted all experiments. 
 
Procedure 
There were three phases; a slot machine 
pretest, nonarbitrary relational training and 
testing, and a slot machine posttest.  
Slot machine task pretest: This phase was 
near-identical to that of Zlomke and Dixon 
(2006). Participants were presented with the 
following instructions: 
 
On the following screen you will see 
a button in the middle of the screen. 
When you click on the button with 
your mouse two slot machines will 
be revealed. Click your mouse on the 
slot machine you would like to play 
and earn as many points as possible.  
 
On clicking the button, participants were 
presented with a grey screen that contained a 
red button in the centre of the screen with the 
instruction, “click here”. Clicking the red 
button took the participants to a new screen 
presenting a blue rectangular box labelled 
Slot Machine 1, and a yellow rectangular box 
labelled Slot Machine 2. These boxes were 
approximately 6 cm by 2.5 cm and were 
randomly positioned on opposite sides of the 
bottom of the screen across trials. 
  To play a slot machine, participants 
clicked on the “bet credit” button, which 
enabled the “spin” button to become 
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Figure 1: Examples of the screen layout from the nonarbitrary relational training and testing phases. The screen 
on the left shows an example of a trial used to train contextual functions of LESS-THAN for the blue background 
color, while the screen on the right shows an example of a trial used to train contextual functions of MORE-THAN 
for the yellow background color. Arrows indicate the predicted correct comparisons. 
 
available. All participants started with 100 
credits and could only bet one credit at a time. 
Clicking the spin button caused the reels to 
spin. The reels spun for approximately 3 s. 
Sound effects resembling actual slot machines 
were played as the reels spun. A winning spin 
consisted of three identical symbols on the 
pay off line, and resulted in one credit being 
awarded to the participant in the “Total 
Credits” box at the top left of the screen and 
one credit being displayed in the “Amount 
Won” box at the top right of the screen. A 
losing spin consisted of two matching 
symbols or no matching symbols and one 
credit was subtracted from the Total Credits. 
After playing a slot machine, a button 
instructing the participant to “Click here to 
continue” became highlighted and took the 
participant back to the initial grey screen. 
 A concurrent random ratio schedule of 
reinforcement was in effect with a probability 
of reinforcement of .5 (i.e., every response 
had a 50% probability of a win). Each 
component of the schedule required one credit 
to spin, and the magnitude of reinforcement 
was held constant (i.e., one credit net gain or 
loss) such that all participants ended the task 
with the same number of credits. The 
components differed only in color (i.e., 
yellow or blue). This phase consisted of 50 
trials. 
Nonarbitrary relational training and 
testing: The aim of this phase was to establish 
the contextual functions of MORE THAN and 
LESS THAN for the yellow and blue 
background colors, respectively. There were 
three sets of three stimuli. Each set of stimuli 
consisted of three images representing three 
different quantities; least amount, 
intermediate and most. This generated three 
trial types for each set of stimuli: Less-than 
(least)/more-than (intermediate), less-than 
(least)/more-than (most) and less-than 
(intermediate)/more-than (most). Because 
each trial was presented with both contextual 
cues, this generated six trials for each set of 
stimuli. The three sets of stimuli were apples 
(1, 4, 7), basketballs (1, 2, 8) and beakers (1, 
3, 6). Each image was approximately 5cm by 
4cm. 
  The contextual cue (background screen 
color) appeared first followed by the two 
comparison stimuli side by side at the bottom 
of the screen. During training, feedback (i.e., 
“correct,” “wrong”) was immediately 
presented in the center of the screen for 1.5 s 
following a response. All trials were followed 
by an intertrial interval of 2.5 s. When the 
MORE THAN contextual cue (i.e., yellow) 
was presented, selecting the greater, relative 
quantity comparison was reinforced. When 
the LESS THAN contextual cue (i.e., blue)  
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Table 1 
Showing the number of correct responses made by participants during the nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
phases in Experiment 1. 
1 
Indicates pass or fail status for test block (F = fail; P = pass). 
Participant Nonarbitrary relational training 
Correct responses out of 36 
(min. 32) 
Nonarbitrary relational testing 
Correct responses out of 36 
(min. 36) 
1 21  
 34 36P
1
 
2 20  
 22  
 34 17F 
 28  
 33 23F 
 30  
 29  
 32 18F 
3 14  
 19  
 37 36P 
4 30  
 33 0F 
 33 5F 
 36 15F 
5 29  
 35 34F 
 36 36P 
6 34 36P 
Mean 29.47 23.27 
SD 6.5 13.3 
 
was presented, selecting the lesser, relative 
quantity comparison was reinforced (see 
Figure 1).  
 Participants were given the following 
instructions:  
 
During this phase of the experiment 
you will be presented with two 
images on screen surrounded by 
another image. You must learn to 
always choose the correct image on 
the screen.  
 
There were a total of 36 trials and 
participants had to reach a criterion of 32 
successive correct responses before 
progressing to the testing phase. If a 
participant did not reach criterion responding, 
they were exposed to the training phase again. 
If a participant failed to achieve criterion after 
three consecutive training blocks then the 
program terminated and the participant was 
excused. 
Immediately upon reaching criterion, 
participants were exposed to the nonarbitrary 
relational test in which the following three 
novel stimulus sets were presented: toy blocks 
(1, 3, 7), red dots (3, 5, 9) and hats (1, 3, 7). 
No feedback was presented after any trial, and 
participants had to respond correctly across 
36 consecutive trials in order to progress to 
the next phase. If a participant failed to 
114 ALICE HOON et al.  
 
Figure 2: Percentage of responses allocated to the preferred yellow (more than) slot machine during pretest and 
posttest exposures for the four participants who passed nonarbitrary relational training and testing in Experiment 1. 
 
achieve this criterion, he/she was re-exposed 
to the nonarbitrary relational training before 
again receiving the nonarbitrary relational test 
for a maximum of three times. It is important 
to note that during the nonarbitrary relational 
training and testing phase, the colors of the 
MORE-THAN and LESS-THAN cues were 
not counterbalanced across participants. 
Slot machine task posttest: Again, this 
phase was identical to pretest and that of 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006).  
 
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS & 
DISCUSSION 
Table 1 shows that Participants 2 and 4 
failed to achieve criterion by their third 
exposure to the nonarbitrary relational testing 
phase and were excused from the experiment. 
The remaining participants required either one 
or two exposures to the nonarbitrary relational 
test to meet criterion.  
Figure 2 shows the percentage of 
responses allocated to the yellow slot machine 
at pretest and posttest. It can be seen that 
three participants showed a decrease in the 
percentage of responses allocated to the 
yellow slot machine. Indeed, only Participant 
6 showed a 2% increase in preference for the 
yellow slot machine.   
Experiment 1 failed to replicate the 
findings of Zlomke and Dixon (2006). There 
are several possible explanations for this. 
First, a total of six stimulus sets were used 
during nonarbitrary relational training and 
testing. Previous research has employed up to 
eight stimulus sets, and results suggest that 
nonarbitrary contextual control may be more 
readily acquired using a greater number of 
relevant exemplars (e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 
1995; Whelan et al., 2006). Second, in order 
to test whether the background colors were 
functioning as contextual cues for MORE-
THAN and LESS-THAN, a sorting task was 
introduced following nonarbitrary training 
and testing. In the sorting task, which was 
based on unpublished procedures used by 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006), participants were 
presented with novel stimuli (e.g., the word 
“Jackpot”) and were instructed to select one 
of the two slot machines, blue or yellow. As 
no feedback was presented following any 
trial, the sorting task allows for a procedural 
check that the two slot machines are 
functioning as contextual cues for MORE-
THAN and LESS-THAN when presented in a 
0
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novel, matching-to-sample (MTS) format. 
Previous findings from research on stimulus 
class formation demonstrate a close 
correspondence between MTS test outcomes 
and sorting tasks (e.g., Smeets, Dymond, & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2000). Therefore, 
Experiment 2 sought to use eight stimulus sets 
during nonarbitrary relational training and 
testing and to employ a sorting task prior to 
the slot machine posttest phase. 
 
EXPERIMENT 2  
METHOD 
Participants 
 Six participants (all female), with a mean 
age of 20.4 years (SD: 0.55), participated for 
course credit. Participants‟ SOGS scores 
ranged from 0-1 (M: 0.33; SD: 0.52). 
Procedure 
The procedure for Experiment 2 was 
identical to that of Experiment 1 except for 
the following important differences. First, 
new instructions were employed at the outset 
of the nonarbitrary relational training and 
testing phase. These instructions were: 
 
Later, you will be required to do 
complete a learning task. You must 
learn to choose the correct stimulus. 
For the first part of the task you will 
be given feedback and points will be 
awarded. For the second part, no 
feedback will be given, however the 
computer is still logging your score 
so please continue to choose the 
correct stimulus. Please note the 
change in the background color on 
the screen. The harder you try, the 
faster you will finish.  
 
Second, eight sets of stimuli were used in the 
nonarbitrary relational training and a further 
eight novel sets were used in the nonarbitrary 
relational test. The eight sets of stimuli were: 
apples (1, 4, 7), basketballs (1, 2, 8), beakers 
(1, 3, 6), toy blocks (1, 3, 7), red dots (3, 5, 9), 
hats (1, 3, 7), cherries (4, 6, 18) and ladybirds 
(2, 4, 8), pictures of leaves (1, 3, 5), traffic 
lights (1, 3, 4), boats (1, 2, 3), pencils (1, 2, 
3), pigs (3, 12, 18), tractors (1, 2, 3), turtles 
(2, 3, 4) and pumpkin lanterns (1, 2, 3). A 
total of 48 trials were presented in both the 
nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
phases. In the training phase, participants 
were required to emit 43 correct successive 
responses in order to progress to the test 
phase. To complete the test phase, 
participants were required to emit 48 correct 
responses to achieve criterion. The 
predetermined exposure criterion for the 
nonarbitrary relational test was omitted for 
Experiment 2. 
 Third, a sorting task was introduced 
following the nonarbitrary relational test 
phase. Participants were given the following 
on screen instructions:  
 
Your job is to put each image at the 
top of the screen into the correct box.  
Click on the image and drag into one 
of the two boxes at the bottom of the 
screen.  You will not receive any 
points for your response.  Do your 
best to place the images correctly.  
 
Participants were presented with an on-screen 
blue rectangular box labeled Slot Machine 1 
and a yellow rectangular box labeled Slot 
Machine 2. Situated directly above the two 
rectangles were two smaller images 
approximately 3cm by 3cm. Three of these 
images were randomly taken from the 
stimulus sets used during the nonarbitrary 
relational training and testing phase, while 
another three were novel stimuli consisting of 
the words „Save‟/„Gamble‟, 
„Jackpot‟/„Bankrupt‟ and „Good‟/„Bad‟. 
Participants were required to click on each 
image, drag it and drop it using the computer-
mouse on to one of the two rectangular boxes 
labeled Slot Machine 1 or Slot Machine 2.  A 
total of 28 trials were presented and no
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Table 2 
Showing the number of correct responses made by participants during the nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
phases. 
1 
Indicates pass or fail status for test block (F = fail; P = pass). 
Participant Nonarbitrary relational training 
Correct responses out of 48 
(min. 43) 
Nonarbitrary relational testing 
Correct responses out of 48 
(min. 48) 
7 28  
 28  
 22  
 31  
 39  
 49 48P
1
 
8 25  
 21  
 31  
 44 47F 
 48 48P 
9 21  
 23  
 47 48P 
10 25  
 28  
 20  
 37  
 49 48P 
11 47 48P 
12 47 48P 
Mean 33.81 47.86 
SD 10.89 0.38 
 
feedback was given. 
 
EPERIMENT 2 RESULTS & 
DISCUSSION 
Table 2 shows that all participants passed 
the nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
phase, with only one participant (P8) 
requiring a second test exposure. Because the 
sorting task phase involved a fixed number of 
trials with no feedback, no results will be 
described for this phase.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage of 
responses allocated to the yellow slot machine 
at pretest and posttest. It can be seen that four 
out of six participants showed an increase in 
the percentage of responses allocated to the 
yellow slot machine.  
The findings of Experiment 2 improved upon 
those obtained during Experiment 1 and bear 
more of a resemblance to those obtained by 
Zlomke and Dixon (2006). The use of eight 
stimulus sets during nonarbitrary relational 
training and a further eight novel sets during 
nonarbitrary relational testing clearly 
facilitated all participants in passing the 
relational test. As such, these findings support 
those of previous studies on multiple stimulus 
relations (e.g., Dymond & Barnes, 1995; 
Whelan et al., 2006) and extend the effect to 
slot machine gambling. The use of the sorting 
task may also have facilitated the results of 
Experiment 2. 
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Figure 3. Percentage of responses allocated to the preferred yellow (more than) slot machine 
during pretest and posttest exposures for all participants in Experiment 2 
 
At this stage in our efforts to replicate 
Zlomke and Dixon, we had shown that 
participants‟ slot machine preferences may 
come under the contextual control of two 
color cues that were established using a 
nonarbitrary relational procedure in which 
two comparisons, not three, were presented 
and that a greater shift in preferences was 
observed when a greater number of stimulus 
sets were employed. However, a key 
difference remains between the procedures 
used by Zlomke and Dixon and those used in 
Experiment 2. Zlomke and Dixon used 
gambling-relevant stimuli during nonarbitrary 
relational training and testing in order to 
establish the relational frame of comparison 
(i.e., more-than/less-than), whereas the 
current experiments have employed 
nonarbitrary stimuli that differed in terms of 
quantity. From the perspective of relational 
frame theory, comparative relational frames 
are involved whenever one event is responded 
to in terms of a quantitative relation along a 
specified physical dimension with another 
event (Hayes et al., 2001). The stimuli used in 
Experiments 1 and 2 differed along the 
physical dimension of quantity, which, while 
effective in establishing contextual cue for the 
background colors, are not the only way of 
training and testing nonarbitrary contextual 
control for use in a gambling context. As 
Zlomke and Dixon showed, stimulus sets 
from a gambling context like monetary 
amounts may also be used because the 
physical dimension is clearly specified. 
Experiment 3 aimed to see if using gambling-
relevant stimuli would lead to participants 
showing a greater increase in preference for 
the yellow slot machine as a result of the two-
comparison nonarbitrary training and testing 
task.  
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
METHOD 
Participants 
 Six participants (5 male, 1 female), with 
a mean age of 21.4 years (SD: 1.14), 
participated in return for £5. Participants‟ 
SOGS scores ranged from 0-1 (M: 0.33; SD: 
0.52). 
 
Procedure  
The procedure for Experiment 3 was 
identical to Experiment 2 except for the
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Table 3 
Showing the number of correct responses made by participants during the nonarbitrary relational training and testing 
phases.  
1 
Indicates pass or fail status for test block (F = fail; P = pass). 
Participant Nonarbitrary relational training 
Correct responses out of 48 
 (min. 43) 
Nonarbitrary relational test 
Correct responses out of 48 
 (min. 48) 
13 46 48P
1
 
14 43 48P 
15 45 48P 
16 22  
 29  
 30  
 32 [withdrew] 
17 42  
 48 48P 
18 20  
 24  
 27  
 35  
 43 47F 
[withdrew] 
Mean 34.71 47.80 
SD  9.67   0.45 
 
following two important differences. First, 
gambling relevant nonarbitrary stimuli were 
employed. Participants were trained with the 
following eight sets of stimuli in the 
nonarbitrary relational training phase: coins 
(1p, 20p, £1), pound notes (£5, £20, £50), 
dice (1, 4, 6), jackpots (5 million, 10 million, 
20 million), poker chips ($5, $25, $500), 
positions (1
st
, 8
th
 10
th
), playing cards (4, 9 and 
King of spades) and letter grades (A+, C+, D-
). Second, unlike in Experiment 2, 
participants in Experiment 3 were not 
presented with novel stimuli during the 
nonarbitrary relational test. Instead, the eight 
stimulus sets were presented in the absence of 
feedback for a total of 48 trials. 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 RESULTS & 
DISCUSSION 
Table 3 shows that four of six 
participants passed the nonarbitrary relational 
test on their first exposure. The remaining two 
participants withdrew from the experiment; 
P18 after making 47/48 correct responses 
during the test and P16 before being exposed 
to the test. Because, as in Experiment 2, the 
sorting task phase involved a fixed number of 
trials with no feedback, no results will be 
described for this phase.  
As shown in Figure 4, three participants 
showed an increase in the percentage of 
responses allocated to the yellow slot 
machine, and one participant showed an 
increased preference for the blue slot 
machine.  It appears, therefore, that the 
modifications incorporated into Experiment 3 
resulted in the predicted performance (an 
increase in preference for the yellow slot 
machine at posttest) in three of the four 
participants. 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 The findings of the present series of 
experiments systematically replicate and 
extend those of Zlomke and Dixon (2006). 
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Figure 4.  Percentage of responses allocated to the preferred yellow (more than) slot machine during pretest 
and posttest exposures for the four participants who passed nonarbitrary relational training and testing in Experiment 
3. 
 
Experiment 1 showed that a nonarbitrary 
relational training and testing procedure in 
which two comparisons were presented on 
every trial was sufficient to establish 
contextual control for the two background 
colors. However, the use of six stimulus sets 
during the nonarbitrary relational phase may 
not have been sufficient to establish 
contextual control as none of the participants 
produced the predicted performance. 
Experiment 2 employed eight stimulus sets 
and a sorting task prior to the slot machine 
posttest phase and four out of six participants 
showed an increase in the percentage of 
responses allocated to the yellow slot 
machine. Experiment 3 replicated the finding 
of Experiment 2 with eight sets of gambling-
relevant stimuli. Overall, the present findings 
demonstrate that participants‟ preferences for 
one of two concurrently available slot 
machines may come under contextual control 
by ostensive situational factors (background 
colors). Furthermore, the findings show that 
participants‟ preferences may come to be 
controlled by these contextual factors even 
though the concurrently available slot 
machines were identical in payout probability 
and magnitude of reinforcement.   
 At this stage in our efforts to replicate 
and extend Zlomke and Dixon‟s study, we 
conducted one final experiment in which 
participants were presented with four stimulus 
sets of gambling-relevant stimuli during 
nonarbitrary relational training and another 
four novel stimulus sets during nonarbitrary 
relational testing. We also omitted the sorting 
task phase. The findings of that final 
experiment demonstrated that all six 
participants allocated the majority of their 
responses to the slot machine that shared 
nonarbitrary properties with the contextual 
cue for more than (Hoon, Dymond, Jackson, 
& Dixon, in press).  Figure 5 summarizes the 
findings of the present study, along with those 
of Hoon et al. (in press), by showing the mean 
difference percentage of responding allocated 
to the yellow slot machine at pretest and 
posttest. As can be seen, the mean percentage 
difference increased from Experiment 2, with 
the greatest difference being observed in the
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Figure 5.  The mean percentage difference in responses allocated to the preferred yellow (more than) slot 
machine during pretest and posttest exposures for each of the four Experiments (note that Experiment 4 refers to 
data from the Hoon et al., in press, study). 
 
Hoon et al. (in press) study (Experiment 4). 
This demonstrates that our systematic 
manipulation of situational factors – 
background colors of slots machines – lead to 
predictable increases in the proportion of 
responses allocated to the slot machine that 
was formally similar to the MORE-THAN 
contextual cue. The relational training and 
testing intervention increased in effectiveness 
across the experiments reported here and that 
of Hoon et al. (in press), as measured by the 
number of participants who passed the test 
block and the resulting difference in slot 
machine preferences at posttest. Our findings 
indicate that nonarbitrary contextual control 
of more-than and less-than relational 
responding is best acquired using a two-
comparison arrangement in which multiple 
exemplars of stimuli differing in gambling-
relevant physical dimensions are employed.  
What then are the implications of the 
present study for understanding the 
development and maintenance of gambling 
preferences in naturalistic settings? Do the 
procedures, borrowed from research on 
derived relational responding, speak to the 
verbal, rule-based processes that constitute 
much of human gambling (Weatherly & 
Dixon, 2007)? Research on derived relational 
responding provides a functional-analytic 
definition of verbal stimuli as stimuli that 
acquire some of their functions by virtue of 
participation in relational frames. 
Functionally defining verbal behavior in this 
way allows for an empirical investigation of 
the intriguing possibility that, for verbally 
able humans, all gambling is derived, verbal 
activity. By this, it is meant that many of the 
events that induce and maintain gambling are 
“discriminative-like”, or verbally constructed, 
and that the behavioral processes involved 
differ from those seen with nonhumans. In the 
context of the present study, it is important to 
note that none of the effects observed were 
derived. That is, the contingencies at 
pretest/posttest were identical and the 
contextual cues were directly trained. We did 
not, for instance, establish the cues as stimuli 
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in a derived equivalence relation and test with 
presentations of the remaining stimuli. To this 
end, the present approach should be replicated 
with stimuli that participate in derived 
relations. Also, because no effects were 
derived in the present study, it is possible that 
the procedures could be adapted for use with 
nonhumans. Virtually all nonhuman species 
studied have yet to unequivocally demonstrate 
derived relational responding, yet a vast 
literature attests to the ability of nonhumans 
to emit nonarbitrary relational responding that 
is controlled by formal features of the 
environment (e.g., Reese, 1968). Therefore, 
future research on gambling should seek to 
extend the present analyses to derived 
relational responding and to paradigms 
adapted for nonhuman research. The two 
approaches can work in tandem because, 
while nonhuman research still has an 
important role to play in the behavior analysis 
of gambling, it is in the arena of human 
operant behavior that further understanding is 
needed (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007). 
 The present findings suggest that the 
types of self-rules emitted by gamblers (e.g., 
“this is my favorite slot; it always pays out 
way more than the others”) may, in fact, 
actually be better considered fallacies because 
payout probabilities were identical for both 
slot machines in the pretest and posttest 
phases. This suggests that self-rules may 
persist despite the relatively low 
reinforcement of such rules. The fact that 
fallacies such as this can develop in non-
pathological gamblers may help to illustrate 
how easy it would be for pathological 
gamblers to develop an illogical self-rule, 
especially as it has been suggested that part of 
the reason pathological gamblers develop 
problems with gambling is due to their 
irrational beliefs (Delfabbro, 2004). The 
present series of experiments offers one 
means of investigating, from a behavior-
analytic perspective, the role of such beliefs, 
rules, or other verbal activity in the 
maintenance of slot machine gambling. 
 The present study has several limitations 
that future research should address, such as 
the fact that the contextual functions were not 
counterbalanced across participants. An 
alternative intervention to counterbalancing 
the contextual cues might be to explicitly 
target the non-preferred color of slot machine 
at pretest as the MORE THAN cue. 
Additionally, future studies might employ a 
research design such as a nonconcurrent 
multiple baseline design in order to overcome 
the limitations of the pretest/posttest design. 
Indeed, another way of demonstrating 
functional control over participants‟ 
preferences and helping to eliminate the 
possibility of whether or not participants 
surmised the purpose of the posttest exposure 
to the slot machine phase would be to employ 
a group of „relational control‟ participants 
who do not receive the nonarbitrary relational 
training and testing phases (see Dymond & 
Rehfeldt, 2000). If the proportion of 
responses allocated at “pretests” and 
“posttest” are similar, then it suggests that the 
nonarbitrary relational phases were necessary 
for the predicted performances to emerge. 
Future research might also consider 
manipulating the payout probabilities of the 
slot machines and juxtaposing the 
reinforcement schedules with the trained 
contextual cues; would the reinforcement 
schedules or contextual cues control the 
greatest shift of preferences? The long-term 
stability of the posttest performance should 
also be examined, particularly under 
extinction contingencies that differ from 
pretest. In sum, much work remains to be 
conducted on the role of contextual factors in 
initiating and maintaining slot machine 
gambling.  
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PERCEPTIONS OF LUCK: NEAR WIN AND NEAR LOSS  
EXPERIENCES 
 
Dustin Daugherty & Otto H. MacLin 
University of Northern Iowa 
 
Current research examining gambling behaviors has tended to focus on structur-
al features such as the “near miss” phenomenon.  Until now this research has 
focused mainly on a near “win” situation and ignored what can be considered a 
near “loss” situation (Wohl & Enzle, 2003).  The present study compared the 
effects of participants‟ (N=132) near win/loss situations when playing a Wheel 
of Fortune slot-machine program designed to manipulate near wins and near 
losses.  Near win/loss events were presented at a rate of 15, 30, or 45 percent of 
the total trials during an acquisition phase.  Participants experiencing near win 
situations at the 45% levels persisted in their gambling behaviors more than the 
participants in other conditions.  A better understanding of the impact of the 
structural variables of a slot machine, such as a near win and loss events can 
help explain gamblers‟ continued tendencies to gamble.   
Keywords: gambling, slot simulation, near miss, luck, extinction. 
____________________ 
Many forms of gambling exist, from casi-
no gambling such as blackjack, bingo and 
craps to pull tabs, scratch offs, and lottery 
tickets.  Gambling has become a popular hob-
by for many Americans, and it is estimated 
that 94% of Americans gamble in their life-
time and more than 10 million people in the 
U.S. encounter a problem with gambling dur-
ing their lifetimes (Petry, 2005).  Though 
many gamblers are aware that the odds are 
against them, some continue to place low 
probability bets because they want to “strike it 
rich,” break even, escape from stressful life 
events, are high sensation seekers, or because 
of some other social or personal reason 
(Daughters, Lejuez, Lesieur, Strong, & Zvo-
lensky, 2003).  What causes gamblers to 
__________ 
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e-mail: Otto.MacLin@uni.edu 
continue gambling despite repeated losses? 
Research in the areas of perceptions of luck 
(Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Teigen, 1998; 
Wohl & Enzle, 2003), and counterfactual 
thinking (Medvec, Madey, & Gilovich, 1995; 
Mellers, Schwartz, Ho, & Ritov, 1997; Wolf-
son & Briggs, 2002) may provide important 
insight as to why gambling behaviors persist 
in certain people and not others.  
 
Perceptions of Luck 
Understanding the relationship between 
perceptions of luck and gambling is one way 
to understand why gamblers continue to gam-
ble, even when the odds are set against them.  
Perceptions of luck may develop from nega-
tive or positive hypothetical thoughts of alter-
native outcomes in the environment (Teigen, 
1998), and may serve as antecedent stimuli.  
For example, if Jack thinks that most people 
win about 10 times in one hour on a slot ma-
chine, then this thought will likely be salient 
when he gambles on any slot machine.  He 
will likely perceive himself as a lucky person 
if he wins more than 10 times and unlucky if 
he wins less than 10 times.  Of course, there 
are other external variables to which Jack may 
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attribute the differences between his alterna-
tive and actual outcome, such as superstitions, 
personal skill, personification of the machine 
(i.e., the machine has human emotions or 
qualities), or rationalizations of near losses 
(Delfabbro & Winefield, 2000).  If luck is 
made salient, however, an individual‟s per-
ception of the stability and origin of luck be-
comes important in explaining persistent 
gambling behavior (Darke & Freedman, 
1997a).   
 
Near Loss Situations 
One situation that has been found to cause 
variations in how people perceive luck is a 
near loss situation (Wohl & Enzle, 2002; 
2003).  The current definition of a near loss is 
“…a special kind of failure to reach a goal, 
one that comes close to being successful” 
(Reid, 1986, p.32).  This definition, however, 
does not fully explain either near win or near 
loss experiences and their affect on behavior.  
A near win event on a slot machine has for 
example, the first two reels stopped on the 
jackpot and the last reel has stopped on a 
blank symbol just above the jackpot.  This fits 
Reid‟s (1986) definition of a near loss in that 
the event is characterized as a failure (i.e., no 
payout), but it came close to obtaining a spe-
cific goal (i.e., all three reels landing on the 
jackpot).  Conversely, one could conceptual-
ize a near loss event as one that nearly results 
in a negative outcome whereas a near win 
event could be conceptualized as one that 
nearly results in a positive outcome.   
Kassinove and Schare (2001) observed 180 
undergraduate psychology students to ex-
amine the effects of the near win on persis-
tence of play on a four-reel slot-machine si-
mulation.  Participants were required to play 
the slot machine for 50 trials, during which 
near wins were programmed into the machine 
at a rate of 15, 30, or 45 percent of the total 
trials or reel spins, followed by the extinction 
phase where the computer was programmed 
not to win or land on a near win event.  Kas-
sinove and Schare‟s (2001) findings indicate 
that participants exhibited the most persis-
tence in the 30% (i.e., 30% of the trials were 
near wins) condition, as opposed to the 15% 
and 45% conditions.   
There are three main arguments that have   
been presented as to why people tend to gam-
ble longer on a 30% near win machine.  Kas-
sinove and Schare (2001) argue that the per-
sistence in the 30% condition could be ex-
plained by operant conditioning.  In other 
words, the near win is paired with a win 
enough times that it begins to serve as a sec-
ondary reinforcer.  Individuals in the 15% 
condition may have extinguished faster than 
the 30% condition because they were not able 
associate the near win with an actual win due 
to the low occurrence of the near win events.  
Participants in the 45% condition, however, 
may have extinguished faster because the near 
win was made so salient that they began to 
realize that no true association between the 
near win and an actual win ever existed.  The 
30% condition appears to provide the greatest 
resistance to extinction. 
Another explanation for the resistance to 
extinction in the 30% condition may be ex-
plained by using Langer‟s (1975) idea of an 
illusion of control.  An illusion of control is 
an irrational belief that one has control over 
the outcome of uncontrollable situations.  
Reid (1986) distinguished chance and skill-
based near win situations by stating that, in a 
skill-based near win, an individual can use the 
situation as a learning experience to help 
him/her maintain control over future expe-
riences.  For example, if an individual gets 
closer to a bulls eye while throwing darts, he 
can learn from that experience.  He can re-
member to point his toes forward, throw 
straight at the target, and grip the dart through 
his thumb and forefinger.  
Chance-based near win situations, howev-
er, should have no implications for future 
successes/failures because past events are in-
dependent of future events. In other words, no 
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matter how a person presses the button on a 
slot machine or taps on his/her cards before 
looking at them, these strategies should not 
improve the chance for success. Individuals in 
Kassinove and Schare‟s (2001) 30% condition 
may have been more likely to misattribute the 
situation to one that involves skill, as opposed 
to random chance, due to internal/stable per-
ceptions of luck.   
Dixon and Schreiber (2004) suggested that 
a near win situation is actually a verbal event 
that has been reinforced by previous near win 
situations. Their reasoning for why near win 
events are reinforcing is that the culture re-
sponds to such situations with verbal sayings 
such as “Wow” and “Keep trying you will get 
it.” In other words, as children grow they are 
shaped with close approximations to the de-
sired behavior. Peoples‟ behavior has been 
reinforced in these types of situations and will 
thus continue to persevere. Therefore, a near 
miss situation is one that we have learned to 
learn from. The effects near win situations 
have on persistence, or resistance to extin-
guishing gambling behaviors, are important to 
understanding gambling behaviors. 
 
Counterfactual Thinking 
Understanding the concept of counterfac-
tual thinking may help explain why a near 
win event has such an influence on persis-
tence in behaviors such as gambling. Accord-
ing to Lim and Tan (2001), counterfactual 
thinking is a term used for the “consideration 
of alternative versions of past events.” These 
thoughts are very much focused on behavior 
in the form of “I should/would/could have 
done something differently.” Mandel (2003) 
identified two types of counterfactual though-
ts: upward and downward. Upward counter-
factual thoughts are those where the imagined 
situation is better than the actual situation. 
Downward counterfactual thoughts are those 
where a worse alternative than that which ac-
tually occurred is imagined.   
Perceptions of luck and counterfactual 
thinking relate to each other in that percep-
tions of luck are often contingent on alterna-
tive situations. Teigen (1998) found that many 
negative situations are seen as lucky. In other 
words, when a negative event occurs, people 
tend to think of worse possible outcomes 
(downward counterfactuals), which lead them 
to attribute the actual event as lucky. For ex-
ample, consider two very serious automobile 
accidents. In the first, no one was injured, but 
both cars were completely destroyed. The in-
dividual may attribute this scenario to bad 
luck, being in the wrong place at the wrong 
time. However, if another passenger happened 
to be killed, in the same accident, the person 
may then see herself as lucky because she was 
not killed. The salience of the more extreme 
negative outcome often causes the individual 
to feel extremely relieved and fortunate that 
the situation was not worse. For example, 
Medvec, et al., (1995) found that bronze me-
dalists in the Olympics were more relieved 
and felt more fortunate than silver medalists 
because they thought of the alternative out-
come of not winning a medal at all. 
Relating perceptions of luck, counterfac-
tuals, and near win/loss events to gambling, 
Wohl and Enzle (2003) asked, “Who would 
feel luckier, someone who just missed a jack-
pot, or someone who just missed a bankrupt?” 
Participants were asked to spin a Wheel of 
Fortune type game in which they either nearly 
missed a bankrupt or nearly missed a jackpot.  
They were then asked to place a bet on a 
game of roulette. After the bet was made, par-
ticipants were asked to complete the BIGL 
scale and various questions regarding counter-
factual thoughts. The results supported the 
notion that luck is related to specific counter-
factual thoughts in that narrowly missing the 
bankrupt caused individuals to use downward 
counterfactual thoughts more often, to have a 
higher belief in personal good luck (measured 
on the BIGL), and to wager more on the sub-
sequent roulette game. Narrowly missing the 
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jackpot caused individuals to use upward 
counterfactuals more often and have a lower 
belief in personal good luck, leading to lower 
wagers on the roulette game.  The information 
above provides a link between the near 
win/loss event and perceptions of luck, which 
can be important in explaining gambling per-
sistency and betting patterns. 
 
Extinction 
In order to understand why certain people 
persist in gambling, it is important to address 
the concept of extinction.  Extinction is “the 
procedure of withholding reinforcement for a 
previously reinforced response” (Pierce & 
Cheney, 2004, p. 100).  This procedure causes 
the specific behavior to decline and eventual-
ly terminate.  However, during the early stag-
es of extinction, the behavior is sometimes 
emitted at a rate faster than the rate during 
reinforcement.  After this “extinction burst,” 
the participant will slowly decrease the fre-
quency of the behavior until it has been com-
pletely terminated.  It has been shown that 
different schedules of reinforcement can im-
pact the rate at which a particular behavior is 
extinguished (Pierce & Cheney, 2004).   For 
example, intermittent schedules of reinforce-
ment are much more resistant to extinction 
than continuous schedules of reinforcement 
because the individual is not expecting rein-
forcement every time the behavior is pro-
duced.  For gambling behaviors, it is believed 
that variables, such as a near win event, can 
decrease the rate of extinction (Kassinove & 
Schare, 2001).   
 
The Current Study 
The current study examined the impact of 
near win and near loss situations on percep-
tions of luck and resistance to extinction on a 
Wheel of Fortune slot-machine simulation.  
Participants were in a 15, 30, or 45 percent 
condition and either a near win, near loss, or 
control condition.  Other than near wins, near 
losses, and wins, all other trials were consis-
tent throughout the conditions.  After the first 
200 trials/spins, the computer began an ex-
tinction phase, during which no near win/loss 
or winning outcomes occurred.  Extinction 
trials were the same for all participants.  Dur-
ing the extinction phase, participants were 
allowed to terminate slot play at their accord.  
After terminating play, participants were giv-
en the BIGL and Locus of Control scales.  
These scores were compared across all six 
conditions to determine the impact a near 
win/loss had on an individual‟s perception of 
luck, locus of control, and resistance to ex-
tinction. It was hypothesized that participants 
in the high density (45%) near win condition 
would continue to play longer during extinc-
tion.  
 
METHOD 
Participants 
Students signed up to participate using the 
Psychology Study Participant Manager, an 
online database through which students at the 
university receive credit in psychology classes 
for participating in research.  The sample con-
sisted of 132 undergraduate students from the 
University of Northern Iowa (66 males and 66 
females).  The age of the participants ranged 
from 18 to 52 with the majority falling be-
tween 18 and 21 (82.6%). Eligible partici-
pants were those who indicated that they had 
gambled on a slot machine (online or at a ca-
sino) within their lifetime, to ensure general 
familiarity with slot machines. Participants 
were also prescreened for pathological gam-
bling and those people were not allowed to 
participate.  
 
Design 
The study employed a 2 (near win/ near 
loss) X 3 (15%, 30%, 45% of near win/loss 
events/trials) between-subjects design and an 
additional control group. The dependent 
measures included scores on the BIGL and 
Levenson‟s Locus of Control Scale, as well as 
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the number of trials participants play on the 
slot machine during an extinction phase.    
Materials 
South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS).  
The SOGS is a 16-item questionnaire com-
monly used as an assessment for potential 
problem gamblers and considered to be a 
highly valid and reliable test for measuring 
pathological gambling (Lesieur & Blume, 
1987; Cote, Caron, Aubert, Desrochers, La-
douceur, 2003). The SOGS was used as a pre-
screening tool to ensure that no probable pa-
thological gamblers participated in the study.  
Locus of Control Scale.  Levenson‟s Locus 
of Control Scale is a 24-item questionnaire 
used to measure the level of an individual‟s 
perception of control over various life events 
(Levenson, 1981).  The questionnaire contains 
three subscales including an internal scale, a 
powerful others scale, and a chance scale.  
The internal subscale measures an individu-
al‟s belief that he or she has control over con-
tingencies in the environment.  The powerful 
others and chance subscales measure an ex-
ternal locus of control, but are distinct in that 
one measures unpredictable (i.e., chance) per-
ceptions, and the other measures predictable 
(powerful others) perceptions. 
Belief in Good Luck Scale.  The BIGL is a 
15-item questionnaire designed to measure 
perceptions of luck (Darke & Freedman, 
1997b).   The BIGL has been shown to be a 
reliable and valid instrument for measuring 
belief in good luck (Darke & Freedman, 
1997b).  Researchers have found that higher 
scores on the BIGL are associated with great-
er expressed expectations of positive out-
comes in future situations (Darke & Freed-
man, 1997a; Watt & Nagtegaal, 2000). 
 
Apparatus 
The simulated three-reel slot machine, 
called Wheel of Fortune, was created using  
Visual Basic.Net and is a modified version of 
one created by MacLin, Dixon, Robinson, and 
Daugherty (2005).  Using this simulation, the 
researcher has the ability to vary the slot ma-
chine simulation to display different back-
grounds, symbols, sounds, and reinforcement 
schedules.  Each reel consists of five possible 
symbols.  The reel configuration from top to 
bottom is $1, 25¢, 50¢, bankrupt, 50¢, $2, $1, 
25¢, $1, 25¢, jackpot, 50¢, and 25¢.  Between 
each symbol is a blank position/space.  Above 
each of the reels is a Wheel of Fortune image.  
Below the reels is a “Credits” display box and 
a “Win” display box that displays the total 
number of credits the user has left and the 
amount won for each spin, respectively.    
The slot-machine simulation is operated by 
a spin button located directly below the 
second reel.  Clicking on the spin button with 
the mouse deducts 1 credit from the credits 
box and activates all three reels, causing them 
to move/spin from top to bottom.  The pro-
gram reads an input file that contains num-
bers, which represent the stopping position of 
each reel after a set amount of time, has 
elapsed.  Each reel stops independently after 
an allotted time.  If the three reels stop with 
the same numbers/symbols on the pay line, a 
win or loss equal to that amount will be added 
to or subtracted from the “Credits” display 
box.  On any given spin the user can win or 
lose their entire total credits by three jackpots 
or bankrupts coming to a stop on the payout 
line.  Along the bottom of the screen is a 
“cash-out” button that will terminate the pro-
gram upon being clicked. Sounds are included 
during each click of the spin button, during 
spin time, and each time a reel stops.  There 
are also sounds that occur when a jackpot or a 
bankrupt symbol stops on the payout line.   
The simulation records the number of trials 
during extinction, the number of total tri-
als/spins, the number of credits, the stopping 
points of the reels for each spin, the total 
amount won, and the total number of near 
win/loss events.   
 
 
 
128    PERCEPTIONS OF LUCK AND GAMBLING PATTERNS 
 
Procedure 
Participants were asked to sign an in-
formed consent form providing an overview 
of the study. Participants were then adminis-
tered the SOGS, BIGL, and the Locus of Con-
trol Scale.  Participants receiving a SOGS 
score of 5 or higher were asked to perform a 
non-gambling-related task and were not used 
for the current study.  After each participant 
completed the surveys, the participants were 
given instructions about the slot-machine 
game they would be playing, the number of 
credits they would start with (100), and how 
to terminate play. They were also instructed 
regarding the remaining questionnaires they 
would fill out during the session, as well as 
the prize for which they would be competing 
with other participants ($10 gift certificate to 
go to the person who cashed out with the 
highest number of credits). 
After the participants were read the in-
structions, they were led into separate 8 ft by 
13 ft lab rooms. Each room had at least one 
computer with a similar setup of multiple 
desks. Once the participant was seated, the 
research administrator showed him/her where 
the cash out and spin buttons were, as well as 
the light switch that was used to inform the 
administrator that the individual had ceased 
play. Participants began the experiment with 
100 credits. When the participant pressed the 
spin button, 1 credit was subtracted from the 
total credits and the three reels began in mo-
tion from top to bottom.  The first 50 trials, or 
the acquisition phase, included 15 separate 
wins: three were $0.25, eight were $0.50, and 
four were $2. The participants were directed 
to continue play until they decided to stop 
playing. 
A separate input file was created for each 
condition/group.  Two phases occurred during 
the study: the acquisition phase and the ex-
tinction phase.  The acquisition phase con-
sisted of 50 trials, 28 of which were identical 
across all conditions.  Of these 28 trials, 15 
wins occurred: three 25¢ wins, eight 50¢ 
wins, and four $2 wins.   This programming 
was done to ensure that each participant 
would win at a rate comparable to a casino 
slot machine.  The remaining trials that were 
identical throughout the conditions were all 
losses. Depending on the condition, the input 
files were created to present near win or near 
loss events at a rate of 0, 15, 30, or 45 percent 
of the remaining 22 trials during the acquisi-
tion phase. For those conditions less than the 
45%, the remaining trials were losses with a 
maximum of one symbol on the payout line. 
A near win event was defined as an occur-
rence of a jackpot symbol stopping on the 
payout line for the first two reels and the third 
reel jackpot symbol stopping before or after 
the payout line. A near loss event was defined 
as an occurrence of a bankrupt symbol stop-
ping on the payout line for the first two reels 
and then the third jackpot symbol stopping 
before or after the payout line.  Any of the 28 
trials that did not consist of a near win/loss 
event were the same throughout conditions. 
On trial 50, the slot simulation went into 
an extinction phase.  The extinction phase 
consisted of 200 additional trials with no wins 
or near win/loss events.  Once participants 
decided to cease play, the researcher adminis-
tered the BIGL. Participants were then asked 
to wait quietly until everyone else had fi-
nished, at which point the person with the top 
score was paid the $10 gift certificate.  
 
RESULTS 
Because we were interested in responding 
during extinction, participants who terminated 
the session prior to the extinction phase (i.e., 
50 trials) were excluded from all subsequent 
analyses, thus eliminating 24 of the original 
132 participants.  A repeated measures analy-
sis for changes in BIGL scores from pre to 
post test across nears and density determined 
that there was a significant difference, F (1, 
86) = 6.512, p < .05, MS = 57.91. There was 
no difference in the interaction between the 
nears and density of the nears, F (2, 86) = 
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.871, p = .422, MS = 7.75, or from just the 
density alone, F (2, 86) = .984, p = .392, MS 
= 8.43. However, the nears alone may have 
some affect on BIGL scores though the dif-
ference was not statistically significant, F (1, 
86) = 3.890, p = .052, MS = 34.59.  
A significant difference was found between 
pre and post BIGL scores in three of the seven 
conditions. The near win 15%, F(1, 18) = 
2.27, p = .150, MS = 17.54, near win 30%, F 
(1,15) = .004, p = .952, MS = 8.00 E-02, near 
win 45%, F (1,13) = .387, p = .545, MS = 
3.316, and near loss 30% conditions, F (1,15) 
= .929, p = .350, MS = 5.355, were all not 
significantly different from pre to post test. 
However, the near loss 15%, F (1,12) = 6.80, 
p < .05, MS 39.61, near loss 45%, F (1,13) = 
16.602, p < .01, MS = 52.066, and control 
conditions, F (1,14) = 6.921, p< .05, MS 
60.854, were all significantly different from 
pre to post test.   
Near win conditions were not more resis-
tant to extinction than the near loss condi-
tions. No significant differences were found 
for age, F (12, 107) = .1.240 p = .268, MS = 
1378.74, gender, t (106) = 1.262, p = .210, 
MD = 8.21, year in school, F (4, 107) = .381 
p = .822, MS = 444.97, or ethnicity, F (3,107) 
= .791 p = .502, MS = 908.26, in regards to 
the number of trials played.  A 2 X 3 ANOVA 
revealed no significant difference in trials 
played for the interaction between nears and 
density, F (2, 86) = 2.19 p = .118, MS = 
2502.31, or just the nears alone, F (1, 86) = 
.053 p = .819, MS = 60.60. However, a sig-
nificant difference across density was found, 
F (2, 91) = 3.49, p < .05, MS = 4002.13 (see 
Figure 1). A Post Hoc analysis using Tukey‟s 
HSD indicated that the 30% condition was 
significantly less than the 45% condition (p < 
.05, SE = 8.41). 
There was no significant difference between 
the near loss 15% and 30%, t (27) = -.591, p = 
.560, the near loss 15% and 45%, t (25) = -
.187, p = .853, or the near loss 30% and 45%, 
t (28) = -.414, p = .682. Though there was al-
so no significant difference between the near 
win 15% and 45%, t (31) = 1.527, p = .137, 
there was a difference between the near win 
45% and the near win 30% (t (28) = -3.173, p 
< .01), and the difference between the near 
win 15% and near win 30% approached signi-
ficance (t (33) = -1.96, p = .058). 
Finally, scores on the BIGL and the exter-
nal subscale of the LOC were significantly 
positively correlated (r = .316, p < .01). The 
external subscale was also significantly corre-
lated with the internal subscale (r = -.290, p <       
.05) and the powerful others subscale (r = 
.447, p < .01). 
 
DISCUSSION 
The present study examined the relation-
ship between near win/loss situations, percep-
tions of luck, and resistance to extinction on a 
slot-machine simulation. The current results 
suggest that a higher density (45%) of near 
win and near loss trials lead to a greater resis-
tance to extinction than the lesser densities.  
However, further investigation suggests that 
most of this variance between densities may 
be explained in the near win situation and not 
the near loss (i.e., the near win 45% is signifi-
cantly different from the near win 30%). Kas-
sinove and Schare (2001) argued that near 
wins serve as a secondary reinforcer and the 
current data partially support this notion. The 
reason the data only partially support this ar-
gument is because the only significant differ-
ences were in the near win 45% condition.  
An explanation may be that the 45% con-
ditions can be experienced as both exciting 
and frustrating. The stimulation may stem 
from what Cote et al. (2003) attribute to out-
come expectancy. In other words, the gambler 
is actually anticipating a win or a loss and will 
often experience mixed emotions during near 
experiences.  Immediately following an in-
crease in arousal, the gambler experiences the 
opposite emotion. For example, in the near 
win experience, frustration comes after realiz-
ing that they have not obtained the outcome 
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they desired (i.e. the jackpot). Now the gamb-
ler has two choices, he/she could: 1) stop 
playing the machine or 2) continue to play the 
machine.  
Research suggests that people may contin-
ue to gamble due to an irrational belief that 
they have control over the outcome of the sit-
uation. This „illusion of control‟ is often con-
fused by the gambler with skill based events 
and is probably learned through verbal rein-
forcements in the culture (Langer, 1975).  The 
persistence in the near win 45% may be a re-
sult of the gamblers fallacy, or the belief that 
the odds for a win increase or decrease based 
on previous outcomes. It is likely that the 
higher number of near win situations pre-
sented will cause an increase in the salience 
of a jackpot. Therefore, the associations and 
salience of the jackpot will be much stronger 
in the near win 45% than in the near win 30% 
and 15%. In the near win 45% condition the 
associations and salience of a jackpot lead to 
verbal behavior, such as “A jackpot must be 
just around the corner.” It is likely that the 
participants in the 45% condition have carried 
over this verbal behavior to the extinction 
phase causing them to play longer. In the oth-
er near win conditions, the jackpot is not as 
salient and the verbal behavior is probably 
focused more on how much they were losing, 
causing them to terminate play much earlier.   
This differs from Kassinove and Schare 
(2001) in that 30% near wins were causing 
the most resistance to extinction in slot play.  
It is likely that the 45% near wins in this 
study were leading to an over-saturation of 
near wins (reinforcements).  One explanation 
for why this did not occur in the current stu-
dies‟ 45% condition is because bankrupts ex-
isted and to some extent took away from the 
„near win‟ factor.  This could be why the 30% 
condition was not significantly different in 
this study, but was in Kassinove and Schare‟s 
(2001).  Another reason for this difference 
could be the combination of the payout rate 
with the percentage of near wins.  In other 
words, if the individual is winning more fre-
quently and experiencing near win situations, 
he or she may gamble more frequently.  Fu-
ture studies will need to address this issue and 
control for different payout rates in relation to 
the percentage of near wins.   
There were no significant differences 
across density in the near loss conditions. One 
explanation to account for this is that a near 
loss is in the same stimulus class as a normal 
loss (i.e., both experiences result in a loss). 
Therefore, there should be no difference be-
tween the near loss conditions and the control 
condition, because the near loss does not ap-
pear to function beyond the „loss‟ stimulus 
class. In other words, the gamblers in the near 
loss conditions are experiencing very similar 
situations to those in the control condition.  
Another finding of the current study is that 
BIGL scores were positively correlated with 
the external subscale of Levenson‟s locus of 
control questionnaire. Darke and Freedman 
(1997b) found a similar correlation when con-
structing the BIGL and suggest that people 
who report that outcomes in their lives are 
mostly determined by external factors, such as 
luck, also are reporting a higher perception of 
good luck. Darke and Freedman (1997b) also 
suggest that the BIGL is an assessment of a 
stable perception of luck over time, however, 
our results challenge this notion. The results 
indicate that scores on the BIGL changed 
from pre to post test, similar to the findings of 
other research examining between subjects 
differences (Wohl & Enzle, 2002; Wohl & 
Enzle, 2003).   
The current results do not fully support 
Wohl and Enzle‟s theory (2002), which ar-
gues that games of chance deprive people of 
any way of asserting control over the out-
comes. Possessing an illusion of control that 
one can manipulate luck to work in his/her 
favor during these games may be one way 
that people manage these situations. Though 
Wohl and Enzle (2003) have been successful 
in manipulating their participants‟ perceptions 
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of luck, we have not been able to replicate 
their findings (Brummer, Daugherty, & Mac-
Lin, 2004; Sauceda, Pisney, Decker, Daugher-
ty, & MacLin, 2004).  Their findings indicate 
that individuals tend to feel more personal 
luck when avoiding something aversive (i.e. 
the bankrupt) and less luck when avoiding 
something rewarding (i.e. the jackpot). The 
current findings offer a more extensive expla-
nation in that perceptions of luck do vary sys-
tematically across conditions. In each condi-
tion the pre and post test scores on the BIGL 
drop, with the exception of the near win 45%. 
However, the differences in pre to post test on 
the BIGL systematically decrease as the num-
ber of near win experiences increases. Most 
importantly, the near win 45% condition ac-
tually reports a higher post test BIGL score. It 
appears that the near wins are maintaining the 
internal quality of luck.   
According to Teigen et al., (1999) bad luck 
situations are more likely to be defined as a 
bad event that got worse, whereas a good luck 
is situation is usually defined as a bad situa-
tion turned good. The near win is a stimulat-
ing event that has been shown to increase 
gambling persistency. Participants experienc-
ing a higher density of near wins may actually 
start to believe that the jackpot is “just around 
the corner” and feel prematurely lucky. These 
individuals will use luck to manipulate the 
outcome of the situation on higher near win 
density machines, more so than lower density 
machines.  
The near loss conditions, again, are likely 
to be in the same stimulus class as a normal 
loss, and therefore participants should report 
similar difference scores on the BIGL in the 
near loss and control conditions. In Wohl and 
Enzle‟s (2002) near loss condition partici-
pants still won something (i.e. ten tokens). 
This is a situation that would fit perfectly into 
Teigen et al.‟s (1999) definition of what a 
lucky event should entail. The near loss expe-
rience in the current study is much similar to 
what Teigen et al. (1999) define as a bad luck 
situation. Participants not only lost on each of 
the near loss events, but these events contin-
ued to occur throughout the study.  
It may also be true that counterfactual 
thoughts also change or become less salient 
with the repeated exposure of the nears. This 
may be why the current study has found dif-
ferent results than what previous research has. 
The near win conditions may be using a coun-
terfactual “I almost won the jackpot”, while 
the near loss condition counterfactual may be 
much less positive. Future research could ex-
amine the specific thought processes occur-
ring during the near win/loss events using a 
think out loud method.  The current study ex-
tends the knowledge on the relationship be-
tween specific gambling situations, percep-
tions of luck, and resistance to extinction.  
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STUDYING GAMBLING EXPERIMENTALLY: THE VALUE OF 
MONEY 
 
Jeffrey N. Weatherly & Ellen Meier 
University of North Dakota 
 
Determining whether “gambling” behavior in the laboratory differs as a function 
of whether or not participants are risking actual money is important because the 
outcome will determine whether results from laboratory research can be genera-
lized to actual gambling.  Eighteen participants played video poker in two sepa-
rate sessions.  In one, they risked credits that had no monetary value and in the 
other they risked credits worth money.  Results showed that participants played 
a similar number of hands and played with similar accuracy regardless of 
whether or not the credits had monetary value.  However, participants risked 
significantly fewer credits when the credits were worth money than when they 
were not.  These results suggest that findings from studies on gambling that do 
not have participants risk real money may indeed generalize to actual gambling, 
but that making such generalizations should be done with caution as the amount 
of risk people are willing to take may be overestimated. 
Keywords: Gambling, Money, Motivation, Video Poker, Risk. 
____________________ 
 
The research literature on gambling is not 
small. A literature search of the PsycINFO 
database, conducted on November 11, 2007, 
using the word “gambling” in an all-text 
search, identified 3,441 sources. Although 
impressive, this literature is nearly devoid of 
experimental research. A second search of the 
same database that cross-referenced “gam-
bling” and “experiment” yielded only 172 
sources (not all of which directly studied 
gambling, represented actual experiments, or 
both). Even at the most liberal level of analy-
sis, these searches support the conclusion that 
only approximately 5% of the published scho-
larly works on gambling are experimental in 
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nature. Importantly, this low percentage is not 
the product of using the incorrect database.  A 
search for “gambling” on PubMed conducted 
on November 11, 2007, yielded 2,144 
sources. A search for “gambling” and “expe-
riment” yielded a mere 48 sources. 
Given the popularity of gambling and the 
problems that can be associated with it (e.g., 
the worldwide prevalence rate of pathological 
gambling likely ranges between 1 – 2%, see 
Petry, 2005, for a review), the overall lack of 
experimental research might be surprising.  
After all, experiments arguably represent the 
most direct and straightforward procedure for 
determining cause-and-effect relationships. If 
scientists and practitioners in the field are in-
terested in understanding the factors that 
promote and maintain gambling behavior, as 
well as identifying the potential causes of pa-
thological gambling, then one would perhaps 
expect a larger amount of experimental re-
search on gambling than currently exists. 
There are, however, legitimate reasons for 
the paucity of experimental research on gam-
bling (see Weatherly & Phelps, 2006, for a 
review). In the United States, for instance, it 
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is against the law in many states to own mod-
ern casino equipment (e.g., slot machines) 
unless you are a licensed casino. This draw-
back can be partially circumvented by using 
software simulations that accurately mimic 
what gamblers would experience in a real ca-
sino (e.g., MacLin, Dixon, & Hayes, 1999).  
Even with realistic simulations, one also en-
counters difficulty in mimicking the conse-
quences faced by the actual gambler. Specifi-
cally, actual gamblers face the possibility of 
losing (their own) money. For research pur-
poses, many investigators are constrained by 
laws that prevent them from having partici-
pants risk money.  Even when it is possible, 
the money participants risk is not their own.  
Rather it is staked to them by the experimen-
ter (e.g., Dannewitz & Weatherly, 2007). 
These issues gain in importance because 
research from our laboratory suggests that the 
presence of money in the procedure can influ-
ence the results of the experiment.  For in-
stance, Weatherly and Brandt (2004) had par-
ticipants play a simulated slot machine.  
Across groups (Experiment 1) or sessions 
(Experiment 2), the participants played the 
simulation with credits that were worth $0.00, 
$0.01, or $0.10 each.  Results of both experi-
ments demonstrated that participants’ betting 
behavior varied as a function of the monetary 
value of the credits.  Specifically, participants 
played more trials and bet more credits the 
less the credits were worth.  Participants were 
most conservative when the credits were at 
their highest monetary value (i.e., $0.10 
each). 
Weatherly, McDougall, and Gillis (2006) 
showed that even showing participants money 
can alter their behavior.  In their procedure, 
participants were asked to play a slot-machine 
simulation.  One group was told that they had 
been staked with 100 credits worth $0.10 each 
(i.e., $10).  The second group was shown a 
$10 bill and told that it could be used to se-
cure 100 credits worth $0.10 each on the si-
mulation.  The final group was handed the  
$10 bill and told that, if they wanted to play 
the slot-machine simulation, they could return 
the bill in exchange for 100 credits worth 
$0.10 each.  Results showed that 3 of the 36 
participants chose not to gamble and simply 
keep what they had been staked.  All three 
participants were from the final group who 
had physically handled the money.  Further-
more, participants in the group who had han-
dled the money bet fewer credits when play-
ing the simulation and quit earlier than did 
participants in the other groups. 
Such results are not limited to our own la-
boratory.  For instance, McCall and Belmont 
(1996, Experiment 1) demonstrated that cus-
tomers left larger tips for wait staff when the 
tip tray was emblazoned with the emblem of a 
major credit card versus when it was not.  
These results can be considered consistent 
with those of Weatherly et al. (2006) in that 
credit cards are a step removed from actual 
cash money.  Thus, consistent with the results 
of Weatherly and Brandt (2004), results from 
other studies indicate that participants’ be-
come more conservative as the salience of 
money is increased. 
More recent research suggests that the in-
fluence of money in experiments designed to 
study gambling may extend beyond simply 
how much people bet.  Weatherly, Austin, 
and Farwell (2007) recruited self-identified 
experienced and novice poker players to play 
three different types of video poker.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, “experts” and novices did not 
differ in how accurately they played.  Both 
groups committed the most errors (i.e., hold-
ing or discarding cards that reduced their rate 
of return below the optimal) when playing 
“Loose Deuces,” a five-card draw game in 
which Two’s are wild. 
Dixon, Jackson, Pozzie, Portera, Johnson, 
and Horner-King (2007) recently reported a 
systematic replication of Weatherly et al. 
(2007).  They recruited participants to play 
“Loose Deuces” video poker.  After taking 
baseline measures of accuracy of play, these 
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researchers attempted improve participants’ 
performance through training. Their attempt 
was successful.  Relevant to the present study, 
however, was the baseline measure of accura-
cy.  Whereas participants in Weatherly et al. 
(2007) played at nearly 70% accuracy, partic-
ipants in Dixon et al.’s study had a baseline 
accuracy rate of less than 50%.  One potential 
explanation for this difference is the underly-
ing motivation of the participants.  Partici-
pants in Weatherly et al. (2007) played for 
money and could increase their winnings by 
performing well. Participants in Dixon et al. 
(2007) played for extra course credit, but not 
for money. 
It is worth noting that this issue is not new.  
For instance, Anderson and Brown (1984) 
reported that changes in participants’ heart 
rate when “gambling” was influenced by the 
amount of money being risked. Indeed, a 
number of physiological changes (e.g., corti-
sol levels) have been shown to vary as a func-
tion of the value of the risk involved (see Pe-
try, 2005, for a discussion). However, the is-
sue has not been systematically pursued or 
resolved, likely because so little of the re-
search on gambling involves the use of expe-
rimentation. Furthermore, although research 
indicates that the stakes influence physiologi-
cal measures, to the best of our knowledge it 
has not been directly demonstrated that the 
stakes influence gambling behavior. 
If laboratory research on gambling is going 
to inform us as to the mechanisms and 
processes that contribute to and control gam-
bling behavior, then the validity of the proce-
dures used in such research should be estab-
lished.  Given research results to date, how 
people “gamble” in laboratory situations may 
differ depending on the consequences they 
face during the procedure. Namely, partici-
pants may “gamble” differently when they are 
risking money than when they are not. If true, 
then one could legitimately question whether 
research results from experiments on gam-
bling than do not have participants risk money 
will generalize to gambling in the “real 
world.” 
The present experiment was designed to 
assess the importance of using money as a 
consequence when participants gamble in a 
laboratory setting. Participants were given 
two opportunities to play video poker. On one 
occasion, the credits they were staked had no 
monetary value. On the other occasion, the 
credits were worth $0.05 each and the partici-
pants could win or lose money by playing the 
game. Based on prior research, we predicted 
that participants would play more hands, bet 
more credits, and make more mistakes in play 
when gambling credits with no monetary val-
ue than when gambling credits with monetary 
value. 
 
METHOD 
Participants  
Eighteen individuals (11 females, 7 males) 
were recruited from the psychology depart-
ment participant pool at the University of 
North Dakota. To participate in the gambling 
sessions, individuals needed to be 21 years of 
age or older, score below 5 on the South Oaks 
Gambling Screen (SOGS; Lesieur & Blume, 
1987), and have the ability to operate a com-
puter mouse. Participants ranged in age from 
21 to 44 years of age (mean = 25.72 years old, 
SD = 6.47 years).  SOGS scored ranged from 
0 to 2 (mean = 0.39, SD = .70). One partici-
pant self identified as Hispanic/Latino, one as 
American Indian, and the remaining 16 as 
White. Twelve of the 18 participants indicated 
that their annual income was less than 
$15,000. 
 
Materials   
Participants completed three separate sur-
vey measures. The first was a demographic 
questionnaire that asked the participant’s sex, 
age, marital status, race/ethnicity, and annual 
income. This information was collected be-
cause these factors are known risk factors for 
pathological gambling (see Petry, 2005). The 
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second questionnaire was the SOGS (Lesieur 
& Blume, 1987), which is a 20-item measure 
designed to assess the person’s gambling his-
tory.  It is the most widely used survey meas-
ure for pathological gambling (see Petry, 
2005), with a score of 5 or more indicating 
the potential presence of pathology. The final 
measure was the Gambling Functional As-
sessment (GFA; Dixon & Johnson, 2007).  
The GFA is a 20-item measure that is de-
signed to assess the consequences that may 
maintain the person’s gambling behavior.  
Four possible consequences are assessed: es-
cape, monetary rewards, the sensory expe-
rience, and attention. 
The experiment was conducted in a win-
dowless room that measured approximately 2 
m by 2 m. The room contained two tables and 
two chairs, with a personal computer on each 
table. The same video-poker software (Zam-
zow Software Solutions, 2003) was loaded on 
to each computer. The researcher pro-
grammed the software to play a five-card-
draw poker game called “Loose Deuces.”  
This game is a variation of a standard, Jacks-
or-Better poker game with the exception that 
Two’s are wild cards. The player is dealt five 
cards, can choose which of those to hold or 
discard, and then draw. The five cards held 
after drawing new cards determines the out-
come of the gamble. The game allowed the 
participant to bet one to five credits per hand.  
Obtaining at least three of a kind was required 
to return the player’s original bet.  In addition 
to regular poker hands (i.e., Straight, Flush, 
Full house, etc.), the game paid for Five of a 
kind (15-1 odds), a Royal flush with Two’s 
(25-1 odds), and Four two’s (500-1 odds). 
In terms of dependent measures, the soft-
ware recorded a variety of measures during 
play. Measures included the number of hands 
played, number of coins bet, number of coins 
won, and number of errors made during play.  
On each particular hand, the optimal play was 
the one that maximized the player’s rate of 
return given the five original cards that had 
been dealt. All plays that reduced the player’s 
average rate of return were recorded as errors 
despite the possibility that the player could 
win credits by making an “error.” Players 
were not notified as to what the best play was 
for a given hand or as to whether they had 
made the optimal choice. The only informa-
tion provided to participants was the pay table 
that appeared on the screen above where the 
cards were displayed (see Jackson, 2007). 
 
Procedure   
Participants were run individually. At the 
beginning of the session, the researcher in-
itiated the informed consent process.  Once 
the participant provided informed consent, the 
researcher had the participant complete the 
three questionnaires.  The researcher imme-
diately scored the SOGS.  If the participant 
scored 5 or more on the SOGS, the researcher 
provided the participant with extra credit for 
the person’s psychology course (if applicable) 
and dismissed the participant.  One participant 
was dismissed because of a SOGS score 
greater than 5.  This participant was replaced 
(i.e., 18 participants completed the gambling 
sessions). 
The researcher then seated the participant 
in front of one computer and read the partici-
pant the following instructions: 
 
You will now be given the opportunity to play 
video poker.  Specifically, you will be playing a 
game called Loose Deuces, which is a 5-card-
draw poker game in which 2’s are wild.  You 
have been staked with 100 credits. Your goal 
should be to end the session with as many cre-
dits as you can.  The game will end when you 
have lost all your credits, you choose to quit, or 
15 min has elapsed. Do you have any questions? 
 
Questions were answered by repeating the 
appropriate portion of the instructions. 
Each participant played poker in two ses-
sions, with the second session conducted im-
mediately after the first. In one session, the 
100 credits had no monetary value. In the oth-
er session, the credits were worth $0.05 each.  
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In the session in which the credits had no 
monetary value, the researcher read the fol-
lowing instructions at the point the asterisk 
appears in the above instructions: 
 
These credits have no monetary value, but 
please play as if they did. 
 
In the session in which the credits were 
worth money, the research read the following 
at the point the asterisks appears in the above 
instructions: 
 
The credits you have been staked are worth five 
cents each. Thus, you have been given $5 to 
gamble. You will be paid in cash at the end of 
the experiment for the number of credits you 
have won or have remaining. 
  
The order of sessions was counterbalanced 
across participants so as to counteract any car-
ryover effects that play in the first session 
might have had on play in the second session.  
Nine participants played first with credits 
with no monetary value followed by the ses-
sion in which the credits were worth money.  
The remaining nine participants played for 
money first, followed by the session in which 
the credits had no monetary value. 
For each session, participants played video 
poker until one of the three criteria for ending 
the session was met. After the first session, 
the participant was then situated in front of 
the second computer and was read the appro-
priate instructions for that session. After com-
pleting the second poker session, the re-
searcher asked the participants whether they 
thought they had played differently when the 
credits had monetary value vs. when the cre-
dits had no monetary value. The participant 
was then debriefed, compensated with extra 
course credit (if applicable), paid for the 
number of credits remaining after the session 
in which the credits were worth money, and 
dismissed. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
     Three dependent measures from the poker 
sessions were analyzed. The first was the 
number of hands played during the session, 
which can be viewed as a measure of dura-
tion. The second was the total number of cre-
dits bet across the session, which can be 
viewed as a measure of risk. The third was the 
percentage of hands correctly played during 
the session, which can be viewed as a meas-
ure of accuracy. Each measure was analyzed 
by conducting a one-way repeated measures 
ANOVA using the data from individual par-
ticipants. Results showed that the number of 
hands played per session (M = 58.33 when 
credits had monetary value; M = 57.50 when 
credits had no monetary value) did not differ 
significantly between the two sessions, F(1, 
17) = .01, p=.926 (2 = .001).  Participants bet 
significantly fewer credits across the session 
when the credits had monetary value than 
when they did not, F(1, 17) = 4.64, p=.046 
(2 = .214).  Figure 1 graphically presents the 
difference observed in the credits bet per ses-
sion. Lastly, the difference in the percentage 
of hands played accurately did not differ 
when the credits had (M = 56.68% correct) or 
did not have monetary value (M = 57.62% 
correct), F(1, 17) = .16, p=.691 (2 = .010). 
Results from these analyses, and all that fol-
low, were considered significant at p<.05. 
When responding to the question of 
whether they had played differently when the 
credits had monetary value versus when they 
did not, 7 of the participants responded that 
they had played differently; the remaining 11 
responded that they had not. 
      Pearson product-moment coefficients 
were calculated for the factors asked on the 
demographic questionnaire, SOGS score, 
scores on the four categories measured by the 
GFA, and the gambling measures in each vid-
eo-poker session. Two correlations were wor-
thy of note. The first was the correlation be-
tween age and SOGS score (r = 0.507, p 
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Figure 1. Presented are the total number of credits bet across the session when the credits did or did not have 
monetary value.  The error bars represent one standard error of the mean across participants in that particular condi-
tion. 
 
=.032).  This relationship is opposite of the 
larger research literature (see Petry, 2005), 
but was likely influenced by the limited range 
of SOGS scores in the present sample and/or 
the exclusion of pathological participants. The 
second was between the number of credits bet  
during the session in which the credits had 
monetary value and the consequence of sen-
sory experience on the GFA (r = 0.606, p = 
.008), indicating that participants who scored 
high on gambling for the sensory experience 
tended to risk more money. 
The present experiment investigated 
whether participants’ “gambling” behavior 
would differ as a function of whether or not 
they were risking actual money.  Consistent 
with previous results (Weatherly & Brandt, 
2004), participants in the present study risked 
fewer credits when the credits had monetary 
value than when they did not. However, how 
many hands of video poker participants 
played and how well they played them did not 
differ as a function of monetary value of the 
credits the participants were risking. 
The present results are important because it 
is not feasible for many researchers who study 
gambling to have participants risk actual 
money (i.e., it may be against the law). If 
“gambling” behavior occurred differently 
when participants risked money vs. when they 
did not, then the applicability of results from 
studies that did not involve money could be 
potentially questioned. Thus, the results of the 
present study provide relatively positive 
news. That is, participants played a similar 
number of hands, and played with similar ac-
curacy, regardless of whether or not the cre-
dits they were betting were worth money.  
These findings suggest that results from stu-
dies on gambling that do not involve risking 
money may still generalize to actual gambling 
behavior. 
Of course, one must be wary of placing ex-
tensive confidence in non-significant, or null, 
results. It is possible that if some aspect of the 
present procedure had been altered, then the 
effect of money would have emerged for the 
measures of hands played or accuracy of play.  
One could potentially argue, for instance, that 
the present procedure simply did not employ 
enough participants to uncover a significant 
effect. That argument, however, can be coun-
tered by estimating effect sizes and then 
extrapolating the number of participants that 
would have been necessary to produce a sig-
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nificant effect. For both the measures of 
hands played and accuracy of play, the value 
of Cohen’s F (Cohen, 1988) was zero. With 
that effect size, no number of participants 
would have resulted in a significant effect.  
Thus, the present results do not appear to be 
the outcome of using too few participants. 
The present experiment did find one signif-
icant effect of money. That effect was partici-
pants were more conservative in their betting 
when the credits had monetary value vs. when 
they did not. Given that the monetary value of 
the credits did not influence the number of 
hands played or how well they were played, 
finding a significant effect on the number of 
credits risked should be taken as a warning 
for researchers who study gambling. Namely, 
procedures in which participants are not risk-
ing money may overestimate the risk they 
would actually take were they actually risking 
money. Finding that just under half of the par-
ticipants indicated that they had played diffe-
rently when the credits had monetary value 
than when they did not further underscores 
the need for researchers to take this procedur-
al factor into account when designing their 
studies and drawing conclusions from their 
results. 
It is also worthy of noting that the amount 
of money that was at stake in the present ex-
periment was not substantial. Although the 
effect sizes found for the non-significant ef-
fects were very small, it is certainly possible 
that other effects of money would have 
emerged had participants been playing for 
larger sums (e.g., $100). Because of limited 
funding, it seems unlikely that many re-
searchers would be able to sustain a pro-
grammatic line of research by staking partici-
pants with large sums of money. However, 
investigating this possibility is warranted be-
cause individuals who suffer from gambling       
problems are not risking small sums of money.  
Finally, the present results shed light on 
two potentially opposing “effects” that have 
been reported in the broader literature. One is 
the “house effect,” which is the finding that 
people tend to be more risky with money that 
they have been staked (i.e., house money) 
than they are with their own money (e.g., 
Ackert, Charupat, Church, & Deaves, 2006).  
The other is the “endowment effect,” which is 
the finding that people who are gifted some-
thing, such as money, take ownership of it 
and treat it as if it were their own (e.g., 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). The 
present results would appear to be at least 
somewhat at odds with “house effect” in that, 
although participants may have taken more 
risks with the money they had been staked 
than they would have with their own money, 
they took less risk with staked money than 
they did with valueless credits. Finding that 
participants risked fewer credits when the 
credits had monetary value than when they 
did not would appear completely consistent 
with the “endowment effect.” 
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A CASE STUDY OF A PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLER WAGERING AT 
GOLF 
 
James Borderi, James W. Jackson, & Mark R. Dixon 
Southern Illinois University 
 
The present single case design explored the degree to which a pathological 
gambler’s golf performance would be affected by monetary consequences.  
Using an AB design, a twenty-three year old pathological gambler initially hit 
10 golf balls on a computerized golfing game that interfaced with Playstation2’s 
“Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2006”.  Following baseline, the participant was 
informed that he would be paid 20 dollars if his next 10 swings were closer to 
the golf hole than the prior 10 swings.   The introduction of the monetary 
consequences resulted in the participant increasing shot variability and decreas-
ing shot accuracy. 
Keywords: gambling, wagering, golf, choke response 
____________________ 
 
Wagering takes place in many contexts 
outside of the typical casino.  Gamblers often 
wager on many activities from racing cars, 
finishing highest on a test, acquiring a bar 
patron’s phone number, and performance at 
sporting events.  One sport well known to 
occasion gambling is that of golf (Smith & 
Paley, 2001).  While celebrity golfers often 
draw the headlines of newspapers and televi-
sion (Leahy, 2004), other less known golfers 
share the same tendency to wager during play.  
Bets may be made on overall course play, 
single holes, execution of a particular shot, or 
any combination thereof.   
When the stakes are high, often times ath-
letic performance suffers.  In the sport psy-
chology literature, “choking” is frequently 
attributed to athletes who report substandard 
performance under pressure to do well (Lewis 
& Linder, 1997).  Understanding the auto-
nomic nervous system and the associated 
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physiological responses of anxiety and stress 
are critical to success in any competitive 
sport.  This is especially true in golf because 
players of all skill level will often play for 
salient monetary rewards and they have ample 
time to reflect on their thoughts and emotions 
as they play.  In the context of golf, players 
often describe muscle tension, poor coordina-
tion, trembling hands, accelerated heart rate, 
racing thoughts, and loss of mental focus as 
correlates of “choking’ (Valiante, 2005).  In a 
previous investigation by Bordieri and Dixon 
(under review), it was demonstrated that when 
novice golfers were allowed to putt from a 
distance of 5 feet, participants performed  
better when no financial stakes were on the 
line.  Exploring the interaction of waging and 
golf with individuals suffering from patholog-
ical gambling has not yet been shown in the 
published literature.  As a result, the present 
investigation assessed a self-reported avid 
golfer for potential pathological gambling and 
observed his golf performance during mone-
tary and non-monetary conditions to deter-
mine if a choking response would occur.   
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METHOD 
Participant 
 A twenty-three year old male graduate 
student who self-reported frequent and regular 
play at local golf courses was recruited for the 
study.  Percy was assessed for potential 
pathological gambling with the South Oaks 
Gambling Screen and yielded a score of 14 (5 
or more indicates potential pathological 
gambler).   Percy disclosed playing golf at 
least 1 time per week and wagering an 
average of $50 per round when he gambled 
on the golf course.  He gambled in various 
formats, including golf, on a weekly basis and 
reported very frequently that he wished he did 
not spend as much money as he did on his 
gambling activity. 
 
Apparatus and Setting 
Session took place in a 16 x 20 ft room 
containing an observation mirror and chairs.  
Golf swings took place using a hardware 
device that contained a golf ball and various 
micro-sensors that captured ball travel across 
a 1ft platform when struck by the club.  The 
device, “Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2006,” was 
interfaced with a Sony PlayStation2 video 
game system connected to a 32 inch LCD 
monitor.  Figure 1 displays a photograph of 
the experimental apparatus.  Data were 
collected by an observer that was positioned 4 
ft from the LCD monitor and away from the 
participant swinging the club.   
 
Independent and Dependent Variables 
The independent variable of the study con-
tained two levels: presence or absence of 
monetary consequences contingent upon golf 
swing accuracy.  The dependent variable was 
the distance the golf ball was from the hole 
(in yards) after the swing.   
 
Procedure 
The single session took place by initially 
having the participant complete an informed 
consent form explaining the general purpose 
of the study.  Percy was than instructed how 
to operate the apparatus, which specifically 
included how to align the golf ball on the 
attached tee and to swing as he would normal-
ly on the golf course.  The computer would 
then record the swing, transfer that informa-
tion to the PlayStation2 and automatically 
swing the player’s club accordingly on the 
LCD monitor.   
Phase 1: Baseline.  During baseline Percy 
was instructed to take 10 swings and attempt 
to hit the ball as close to the golf hole as 
possible.   The par 3 seventeenth hole at 
Pebble Beach Golf Links was selected from 
the “Tiger Woods PGA Tour 2006” computer 
simulation.  After each swing, the ball was 
returned to the tee, and a subsequent swing 
was taken.  Ten swings in all were completed 
by Percy.  Data in the form of distance from 
the golf hole in yards were recorded from the 
visual display on the computer monitor by the 
observer.  The observer also repositioned the 
golf ball on the electronic apparatus between 
swings for Percy. 
Phase 2: Intervention.  During the inter-
vention condition Percy was instructed to take 
an additional 10 swings as done during 
baseline.  However at this time, Percy was 
informed the following:  
 
Please take 10 more swings as you just did.  
Yet, if you are able to come closer to the 
hole/cup during these 10 swings than you were 
during the past 10 swings, we will provide you 
with a 20 dollars gift card to a local retailer.   
Your mean or average distance for the 10 
swings will be used to determine if you earned 
the money or not.  
 
All other aspects of Phase 2 were identical 
to Phase 1. 
 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
During the non-monetary conditions of 
Phase 1, Percy obtained a mean distance from 
the golf hole of 12 yards (SD = 7yds).  Upon 
the introduction of the monetary conditions of 
Phase 2, Percy’s performance declined to an 
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Figure 1. Image of the golfing interface. 
 
average of 20 yards (SD = 12yds).  Thus, both 
shot accuracy and consistency declined upon 
the introduction of the potential financial 
compensation.  Both measures of perfor-
mance have been considered evidence of 
“choking” in the golf literature (e.g., Lewis, & 
Linder, 1997), and it appears quite possible 
that Percy did in fact choke when placed in a 
gambling-type situation.   
While our data are compelling there are a 
variety of shortcomings that the study suffers 
from.  First, the experimental design, an AB, 
is rather weak and cannot control for matura-
tion, fatigue, or various other threats to 
internal validity.  A future study should 
consider using stronger designs such as an 
ABAB reversal design.  Second, our partici-
pant’s performance may not necessarily hold 
true for other pathological gamblers exposed 
to a similar experimental situation.  Future 
research should go beyond the present single-
case and use a larger number of participants 
in the study.  Third, we did not have a true 
element of “loss” in the study’s “monetary” 
phase.  While we offered Percy $20 for 
performing better than baseline, he did not 
have to pay us $20 if he did not.  While 
having a pathological gambler actually 
gamble with personal money for the purposes  
of the experiment may seem to hold the 
greatest external validity, we thought it must 
be compromised for ethical standards.  A 
future study might consider having non-
pathological gamblers wager their own money 
during the task and see if the choke response 
becomes more pronounced (i.e. shot accuracy 
declines and variability increases). 
Another limitation of the study was that we 
are not sure as how nonpathological gamblers 
may differ under conditions of monetary 
reward at golf.  Instead our data should be 
considered preliminary, and thus a stimulus 
for more research that explores the wagering 
that takes place by athletes of various sorts.  
Many of which are pathological gamblers.  
Comparative analyses between nonpathologi-
cal gamblers and pathological gamblers are 
warranted as well.  The procedures that we 
employed along with the current software and 
hardware configurations allow for a wide 
variety of future studies.  For example, 
researchers may wish to explore how money 
and no money contingencies vary on every 
shot, and how changing magnitudes of money 
may impact shot accuracy.  
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Figure 2.  Percy’s performance on the golfing task in “yards from the cup.” 
 
In summary, examining gamblers that 
wager at various performance sports seems 
possible, and doing so extends the published 
literature on gambling. While sound decision 
making has been shown to suffer in patholog-
ical gamblers, the present study also shows 
that when face with potential financial gains, 
the motor performance of the gambler suffers 
as well. 
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Behavior analysis has not devoted much research attention to understanding or 
treating gambling behavior, yet it clearly has much to offer. Recently, the advent 
of this journal and other developments has helped to increase the need for, and 
relevance of, behavior analytic approaches to the study of gambling behavior. 
The edited volume by Ghezzi, Lyons, Dixon, and Wilson (2006) is testimony to 
this growing interest. In an effort to further delineate the behavior analysis of 
gambling behavior, Ghezzi and colleagues have produced a compelling and 
timely scholarly overview of behavioral research on understanding and treating 
disorders associated with gambling. The book should serve to stimulate contin-
ued research interest in gambling behavior from within the behavioral communi-
ty. 
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___________________ 
 
Gambling on the outcomes of games of 
chance has been a common feature of human 
culture for centuries. The available evidence 
suggests that occasional gambling is not in-
trinsically harmful.  However, the behavior 
can become problematic when it occurs fre-
quently enough to cause financial and social 
consequences that adversely impact on daily 
functioning. Precisely what variables are re-
sponsible for this often-abrupt transition from 
occasional, recreational gambling to patholog-
ical gambling are unclear (Petry, 2005). 
The prevalence of pathological gambling, 
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which is a recognized disorder in the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM-IV TR; American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), varies across countries.  
In the United States, conservative estimates 
suggest that between 1% and 3% of the popu-
lation has a problem with gambling (National 
Gambling Impact Study Commission, 1999). 
In the United Kingdom, where recently legis-
lation liberalizing gambling has been enacted, 
the prevalence rate is approximately 1% when 
people who exclusively play lottery games are 
excluded (British Gambling Prevalence Sur-
vey, 2007).  
It is interesting to note that the prevalence 
of pathological gambling within the general 
population is higher than that reported for 
many other disorders, including autism.  
However, gambling historically has not gen-
erated comparable levels of research or clini-
cal interest within the behavior analytic re-
search community. There are potentially two 
main reasons why behavior analysts have not 
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extensively studied gambling behavior. First, 
the clinics and outpatient centers where pa-
thological gamblers tend to seek services are 
not settings that typically employ behavior 
analysts, at least as front-line staff. It might 
also be speculated that the high comorbidity 
between pathological gambling and substance 
abuse disorders means that gamblers usually 
seek front-line psychiatric and psychothera-
peutic services before they encounter beha-
vior analysts, if at all. Second, behavior ana-
lysts have lacked a coherent conceptual and 
empirical approach to studying gambling be-
havior, in all of its forms. In much the same 
way as the behavior-analytic explanation that 
slot machines operate according to variable 
ratio schedules of reinforcement was found to 
be incomplete and technically inaccurate 
(Crossman, 1983; Madden, Ewan, & Lagorio, 
2007), the same can be said for an analysis of 
the “very complex control” (Skinner, 1953, p. 
396) exerted by a gambler’s reinforcement 
history in initiating and maintaining gam-
bling. The emphasis on direct-contingency 
explanations of gambling, combined with the 
absence of an empirical research agenda on 
verbal behavior, has clearly hampered basic 
and applied behavioral analyses of the envi-
ronmental determinants of vulnerability to 
pathological gambling, and allowed other re-
search and intervention approaches to domi-
nate (Weatherly & Dixon, 2007).  
Despite these obstacles, behavior analysis 
clearly has much to offer the scientific inves-
tigation of gambling. The relevance of beha-
vior analytic approaches to the study of this 
behavior has become increasingly evident 
over the past few years, with both the publica-
tion of empirical studies in behavior analytic 
outlets (e.g., Journal of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, The Psychological Record) and the 
development of this journal which is devoted 
to publishing such research.  In an effort to 
further delineate the role of behavior analysis 
in understanding gambling and potentially 
treating disorders associated with the beha-
vior, an edited volume by Ghezzi, Lyons, Di-
xon, and Wilson (2006) has brought together 
experts from the burgeoning behavioral re-
search literature to review the existing re-
search and to discuss priorities for the future.  
The behavior-analytic investigation of gam-
bling is important because of the potential it 
offers to alleviate many of the problems re-
lated to disordered gambling. Indeed, beha-
vior analysts routinely improve the lives of 
individuals with other disorders by a rigorous 
scientific approach based on demonstrating 
experimental control over basic behavioral 
processes and then extrapolating findings to 
the treatment of problems of social impor-
tance. This potential that behavior analysis 
has for understanding and treating gambling 
behavior is fast being realized, and the book 
by Ghezzi and colleagues is testimony to this 
growing interest. Indeed, the book should 
serve to stimulate more research interest in 
this topic from within the behavioral commu-
nity. The book includes twelve chapters ar-
ranged into three parts: Theory, Research and 
Application.  
Theory: In the first chapter, Lyons con-
siders what gambling might reveal about the 
nature of addiction. In a cogent review of the 
historical development of the DSM system of 
syndromal classification, he reviews the simi-
larities and differences shared between sub-
stance-abuse addictions and gambling. Lyons 
concludes with a call for research that inte-
grates the biological, psychological, environ-
mental and historical contexts that contribute 
to individual vulnerability to problem gam-
bling. In Chapter 2, Porter and Ghezzi review 
the main theories of pathological gambling, 
including psychoanalytic, biomedical, psy-
chosocial, and cognitive behavioral approach-
es. Their discussion sheds further light on the 
relative dearth of behavior-analytic contribu-
tions to the study and treatment of gambling.  
As the authors aptly note, “how pathological 
gambling is conceptualized ultimately deter-
mines how the problem is treated and pre-
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vented” (p. 20). Porter and Ghezzi acknowl-
edge that, from a behavior analytic perspec-
tive, a coherent empirical analysis of gam-
bling is currently lacking.  More importantly, 
however, they note that our historical reliance 
on relatively simple, direct-contingency ex-
planations of the behavior might be at least 
partially to blame.  Specifically, they discuss 
the “major barrier … set by Skinner, who 
took the position that an analysis of the pre-
vailing contingencies of reinforcement is both 
necessary and sufficient to understanding how 
gambling is acquired and maintained and how 
excessive play may be reduced or eliminated 
(Knapp, 1997)” (p. 35).  The authors also note 
striking similarities between historical beha-
vior-analytic conceptualizations of gambling 
and those used to study verbal behavior.  Spe-
cifically, they note that the development of a 
behavior-analytic approach to gambling be-
havior has been impeded by the field’s pre-
vailing strategic assumptions in much the 
same way as occurred in the domain of verbal 
behavior (Dymond, Roche, & Barnes-
Holmes, 2003).  However, once researchers 
ventured beyond Skinner’s (1957) initial con-
ceptualizations, our understanding of the be-
havior increased exponentially.  Porter and 
Ghezzi speculate that same will ultimately be 
true of gambling behavior. In addition, they 
highlight the importance of the study of ver-
bal behavior for informing research on gam-
bling.  
In Chapter 3, Mawhinney describes the 
use of an Applied Theoretical Cultural Ana-
lytic (ACTA) paradigm to analyze legalized 
gambling in the United States. His molar 
analysis of the metacontingencies involved in 
governmental, societal, and individual in-
volvement in gambling is thought provoking 
and insightful, and, once again, highlights the 
need for “closer conceptual analysis of the 
rule-governed response classes associated 
with gambling” (p. 83). The central role of 
verbal behavior in initiating and maintaining 
gambling outcomes that are, ultimately, 
measured at the molar level remains an im-
portant research objective in behavior analy-
sis. Mawhinney’s ACTA paradigm offers a 
novel means of approaching the study of 
gambling across a range of cultural contexts.  
Research: In Chapter 4, Lyons considers 
the methodological issues involved in under-
taking behavioral research on gambling. He 
acknowledges that laboratory research might 
lack ecological validity because of ethical and 
practical limitations. Quite obviously, these 
limitations make it difficult if not impossible 
to allow research participants to win or lose 
vast amounts of money in the same way as 
they might in real-world gambling situations. 
To attenuate some of the threats to the exter-
nal validity of gambling research, Lyons 
presents two broad categories of alternative 
approaches. The first category involves un-
dertaking naturalistic observation and analyz-
ing public gambling (e.g., lottery) data, both 
of which have proven useful in understanding 
gambling behavior. The second category in-
volves undertaking hypothetical wagers dur-
ing a laboratory task, such as a delay-
discounting task, or actually simulating gam-
bling, such as using computer simulated slot 
machines in the laboratory. Lyons’ chapter is 
a cogent account of the defining features of 
the behavioral approach to gambling and 
should prove an invaluable resource to new 
researchers in designing laboratory-based 
analogues of gambling.  
Weatherly and Phelps’ Chapter 5 offers a 
review of the pitfalls of studying gambling 
behavior in a laboratory situation. The authors 
address the myriad variables that one finds in 
a typical gambling situation (e.g., the choice 
of playing games of differing payout proba-
bilities and magnitude, etc.) and provide some 
potential strategies for recreating such va-
riables in laboratory settings.  Further, they 
discuss the relative merits of animal models in 
overcoming some of the limitations that arise 
when working with humans. The authors then 
attempt to synthesize these issues in order to 
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focus future experimental research. The crux 
of the issue for Weatherly and Phelps, and the 
challenge for laboratory research to overcome 
in the future, is exemplified by the following; 
“because a researcher cannot allow partici-
pants to leave an experiment with less money 
than they arrived with, laboratory research 
will seemingly always fail to replicate the po-
tential for debt that casino gamblers could 
face” (p. 114). They conclude with a call for 
sustained, systematic lab-based research on 
gambling, in which animal models have an 
important role to play (see also Madden et al., 
2007).  
Given the limitations of studying gambling in 
naturalistic settings, the development of la-
boratory simulations is essential.  However, if 
one is not trained in the development of such 
simulations, gambling research may ultimate-
ly prove difficult and costly.  In Chapter 6, 
MacLin, Dixon, Robinson, and Daugherty 
provide detailed, step-by-step instructions for 
writing a simple slot machine simulation us-
ing Visual Basic.NET®. And it works: stu-
dents from the first author’s lab, who had 
never programmed before, wrote their first 
slot machine simulations in a matter of weeks 
using this chapter, supplemented with another 
recommended text by Dixon and MacLin 
(2003). This chapter should prove to be an 
excellent resource for novice programmers 
interested in undertaking a program of gam-
bling research. The authors’ efforts undoub-
tedly will assist in the proliferation of gam-
bling studies by reducing the response effort 
involved with programming simulations. 
The next two chapters in this section 
move from general issues to issues surround-
ing specific topics in the study on gambling. 
In Chapter 7, Ghezzi, Wilson, and Porter pro-
vide an excellent review of research con-
ducted on the “near-miss” effect in slot ma-
chine gambling. “Near-miss” refers to mani-
pulations of the probability of winning, which 
usually entail varying the number and posi-
tioning of symbols on or around the payout 
line. Ghezzi and colleagues outline the find-
ings of several experiments from their lab that 
have compared the effects of the number of 
forced choice trials, percentage of near-miss 
trials, magnitude of reinforcement (i.e., the 
“big win”), and the form of the near-miss on 
choice play. Their findings suggest that, de-
spite the near-ubiquity of behavioral explana-
tions of the near-miss effect (e.g., Skinner, 
1953), more research is needed to identify the 
conditions under which near-misses actually 
sustain extended slot machine gambling. 
In Chapter 8, Dixon and Delaney discuss 
the impact of verbal behavior research on our 
understanding of gambling. In particular, they 
provide an analysis of why the importance of 
verbal behavior historically might have been 
underestimated within the gambling literature.  
Consistent with points made earlier in the 
book by Porter and Ghezzi (Chapter 2), Dixon 
and Delaney note that the field’s reliance on 
Skinner’s (1957) definition of verbal behavior 
potentially could have impeded its incorpora-
tion into analyses of gambling behavior.  The 
authors remind us that Skinner’s conceptual 
analysis sought to extend basic behavioral 
principles from the nonhuman laboratory to 
the domain of human verbal behavior where 
“consequences were delivered by a listener to 
a speaker, which differed from the pro-
grammed consequences delivered in a labora-
tory by an experimenter. Skinner’s definition 
of verbal behavior was one where the beha-
vior of a speaker is mediated by the behavior 
of a listener” (p.172). However, as many 
scholars have argued, this seemingly 
straightforward operant definition meant that 
there was, in fact, no distinction between ver-
bal behavior and other forms of social beha-
vior (e.g., Chase & Danforth, 1991; Hayes, 
1994). It is likely that Skinner himself ac-
cepted this, since he admitted that a nonhu-
man responding for food that is delivered or 
mediated by an experimenter who has been 
conditioned precisely to do so constitute, “a 
small but genuine verbal community” (1957, 
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p. 108). Adopting such a broad definition of a 
integral feature of human behavior inevitably 
lead researchers back to explanations of gam-
bling behavior that were based on direct-
contingencies. However, this was an explana-
tory device available prior to Skinner’s analy-
sis and on which research was already well 
underway in the nonhuman laboratory (Dy-
mond et al., 2003; Hayes, 1994). It seems, 
then, that without a specific, functional defini-
tion of verbal behavior, the behavior analysis 
of gambling was always going to be re-
stricted. 
Dixon and Delaney are cognizant of such li-
mitations, however, and their chapter serves 
as a veritable call-to-arms for behavior ana-
lysts to continue undertaking basic research 
on the impact of verbal behavior on gambling 
by adopting contemporary definitions of 
“rules” and other “verbal stimuli” that are 
based on functional-analytic criteria (e.g., 
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, & Roche, 2001). 
Their account of gambling as “verbally me-
diated behavior” (p. 185) involving the trans-
formation of stimulus functions is an example 
of the empirical and conceptual promise of-
fered by contemporary approaches to the be-
havior analysis of gambling. The authors also 
make the case for the need to include patho-
logical gamblers in behavior-analytic re-
search, to devise more experimental analo-
gues or simulated gambling tasks, to offer 
more salient reinforcers (where ethical con-
straints allow), and to seek out research colla-
boration with non-behavioral colleagues.  
  Application: Given the barriers to study-
ing gambling within naturalistic environments 
and the central role of verbal behavior in un-
derstanding the behavior, researchers often 
must incorporate a range of measures to pro-
vide a more comprehensive analysis of the 
variables influencing gambling. As a result, 
traditional psychometric measures relying on 
self-report often are used. Analyzing the use-
fulness of such measures in measuring gam-
bling behavior is therefore imperative. In 
Chapter 9, Wood and Clapham present the 
findings of research employing the Drake Be-
liefs about Chance Inventory (DBC) and the 
Gambling Behavior Questionnaire.  Both in-
struments have been used to investigate the 
nature of gambler’s erroneous beliefs and to 
determine whether such beliefs correspond 
with particular patterns of gambling. Al-
though correlational in nature, the authors’ 
findings support the continued use of self-
report scales such as the DBC in measuring 
gamblers’ erroneous beliefs. Nonbehavioral 
approaches to the study of gambling place 
considerable emphasis on the role of private 
events such as erroneous or irrational beliefs 
in maintaining gambling (Delfabbro, 2004). 
Supplemental measures of this behavior either 
through self-report scales or, concurrent “talk-
aloud”/protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 
1984), is consistent with the book’s oft-
repeated need to incorporate verbal behavior 
into the analysis of gambling. A key limita-
tion of purely self-report scales, however, is 
that they are restricted in the types of infor-
mation they reveal about gambling behavior.  
For example, they are unlikely to predict 
which individuals are at risk for engaging in 
pathological gambling or what the conse-
quences maintaining gambling actually are.  
Despite their usefulness in helping researchers 
discern particular variables associated with 
gambling, perhaps an equally important con-
tribution is that they illuminate the complexi-
ty of gambling and the need for further re-
finement of measures designed to capture the 
myriad of factors influencing gambling beha-
vior. 
 Another important factor in analyzing 
gambling behavior is understanding the popu-
lations in which this behavior is likely to oc-
cur.  For instance, one of the six known risk 
factors (or establishing operations, see Wea-
therly & Dixon, 2007) for pathological gam-
bling is gender, in that the behavior is most 
prevalent among adult males.  In Chapter 10, 
however, Knapp and Crossman provide a 
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compelling review of the research on gam-
bling in children and adolescents. According 
to some estimates, 86% of children in 4
th
, 5
th
 
and 6
th
 grade had bet money before and 61% 
had bought a lottery ticket (Ladoucer, Dube, 
& Bujold, 1994). The authors note that gam-
bling during childhood can occasion problems 
with the behavior in adolescence.  For in-
stance, an estimated 34,000 underage gam-
blers were escorted from New Jersey casinos 
alone in 2003. Further, Knapp and Crossman 
reveal that approximately two thirds of 18-20 
year olds have gambled on at least one occa-
sion at casinos. Given the extensive evidence 
for underage gambling problems, the authors 
propose that intervention programs should be 
developed on university campuses. Indeed, 
while the literature on gambling in children 
and adolescents has grown almost as rapidly 
as the gambling industry, a satisfactory re-
search-based understanding of the factors that 
lead these groups to gamble still is lacking. In 
a call for more research into these issues, the 
authors claim, “the opportunities for research 
are nearly as rich as the owners of the casi-
nos” (p. 225).  
 Research has shown that the incidence of 
pathological gambling is proportional to the 
availability of, and access to, gambling (e.g., 
Orford, Sproston, Erens, White, & Mitchell, 
2003; Petry, 2005). In analyzing such trends, 
it is important not only to determine factors 
contributing to the rise in the behavior, but 
also its effects on individuals and societies.  
In Chapter 11, Dixon and Moore discuss the 
economic, social and political impact asso-
ciated with the development of gambling es-
tablishments on Native American reserva-
tions. As noted by the authors, Native Ameri-
can reservations are sovereign states; there-
fore, all gambling profits are tax-exempt.  As 
a result, a number of new contingencies have 
been put in place for American society. Dixon 
and Moore offer a behavioral analysis of these 
contingencies in terms of the discounting of 
delayed consequences from both tribal and 
state perspectives. For example, the authors 
analyze factors that might induce tribal lead-
ers to establish gambling establishments, de-
spite the risks associated with such endeavors.  
Perhaps most importantly, the authors reveal 
how these contingencies ultimately lead to an 
overdependence on gaming revenue, an in-
crease in problem gambling among tribal and 
community members, and an increase in 
crime. The authors’ analysis paints a compel-
ling picture of how the detrimental effects of 
gambling extend beyond the individual and 
affect society as a whole.  
In several chapters of the book, various 
authors describe the problems associated with 
pathological gambling.  Moreover, they em-
phasize the dire need for more behavior-
analytic research aimed at extending our un-
derstanding of the behavior, as well as how to 
intervene when it becomes problematic.  It 
seems fitting, therefore, that the final chapter 
reviews the extant literature on effective 
treatment approaches.  In Chapter 12, Petry 
and Roll describe a cognitive-behavioral 
treatment for pathological gambling, the aim 
of which is to develop ways to restructure the 
environment to reinforce non-gambling beha-
viors. The authors provide a concise analysis 
of the environmental factors that might con-
tribute to pathological gambling, and show 
how these factors can be incorporated into the 
development of an effective treatment.  The 
authors describe a therapeutic treatment pack-
age that includes such strategies as self-
reinforcement for non-gambling , identifica-
tion of the environmental triggers for gam-
bling, and working through the positive and 
negative outcomes associated engaging in 
gambling behavior. As noted by the authors, 
early analyses of the effectiveness of this type 
of cognitive-behavioral treatment suggest 
positive outcomes both during treatment deli-
very, and throughout a 12-month follow-up 
period.  Despite these positive outcomes, 
there is clearly much work to be done.  Petry 
and Roll’s chapter no doubt will serve as a 
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catalyst for occasioning further treatment re-
search within the field of behavior analysis.  
Overall, the contributors to this edited volume 
are to be commended for producing a repre-
sentative, informative, and timely account of 
research on the behavior analysis of gam-
bling. The absence of a previous volume on 
this topic makes comparisons or evaluations 
of progress difficult.  Moreover, to do so 
might actually miss the point.  Perhaps what 
is most important is that this book clearly de-
monstrates that behavior analysts can make 
meaningful contributions to the analysis and 
treatment of gambling behavior, and that they 
already are doing so. This book confirms that 
there is much to be gained by an incorpora-
tion of behavioral methodology for under-
standing the origin, maintenance and treat-
ment of gambling problems. Only the future 
will reveal whether or not our research efforts 
have proven useful. 
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